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Bankrupt. The state or condition of one who is unable to pay his debts
1
as they . . . become due.
Over-appropriated. [A] condition of water allocation in which the
quantity of surface water available during a specified period is not
sufficient to meet the expected demands from all water rights [during
2
a specified percentage of time] during that period.

INTRODUCTION
Many western states are on the verge of bankruptcy, with
debts exceeding assets. And yet, they continue to take on addi3
tional debt through contracts and other commitments. Remarkably, in some cases the states cannot even calculate their
4
debts and expenditures with precision. Although this distress
sounds like an outgrowth of the 2008 recession, this crisis in1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (5th ed. 1979).
2. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-400-0010(11)(a)(A) (2000) (based on insufficient
supply at least 20% of the time). The Oregon Allocation Policy also defines
“over-appropriated” with respect to groundwater as “a condition of water allocation in which . . . [t]he appropriation of groundwater resources by all water
rights exceeds the average annual recharge to a groundwater source over the
period of record or results in the further depletion of already overappropriated surface waters.” Id. § 690-400-0010(11)(a)(B); see also id. § 690410-0070(1) (asserting the policy that “[t]he waters of the state shall be protected from over-appropriation by new out-of-stream uses of surface water or
new uses of groundwater”).
3. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUSTAINABLE WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE CALIFORNIA BAY-DELTA 33 (2012), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13394.
4. See infra Part III.D.2; see also State Water Res. Control Bd., Notice of
Public Workshop: Water Diversion Measurement, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (June 9, 2011), http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/
programs/diversion_use/docs/workshop2011july/not_wdm070111.pdf.
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volves water, not money. The states, as debtors, have
overappropriated their water resources. As an official in one of
the West’s most water-bankrupt states, California, complains,
“[w]e annually use more water than nature provides” and continue to “sign water contracts . . . that, on their face, appear to
promise [that the state will guarantee to continue these deliv5
eries].” He describes the debate over water supply as “a mirror
image of our national and state budget battles” and argues, “[i]f
borrowing money ultimately has to stop, so too must the endless [state] promises to deliver water, without regard for the
consequences. We are running up against the practical limitations of supply, and have little way to meet all the de6
mands . . . .”
California is not alone in its struggle with over-promised
water supplies. In fact, the challenge of water shortage extends
far beyond the borders of the United States. In 2009, the World
Economic Forum reported that the world is headed toward “wa7
ter bankruptcy,” with demand far outstripping supply. As
stated by the World Economic Forum, “[the world] simply cannot manage water in the future as we have in the past or the
8
economic web will collapse.”
In the United States, numerous water administrators in
the West routinely issue what are colloquially known as “paper
water rights”—permits that suggest, often unrealistically, that
a certain volume of water will be available for appropriation, at
9
least for a significant portion of the time. The West generally
5. PHIL ISENBERG, CHAIR, DELTA STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, ACHIEVING
CO-EQUAL GOALS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 3, 8 (2011), available at
http://www.deltacouncil.ca.gov/get-document/4291.pdf.
6. Id. at 3.
7. WORLD ECON. FORUM, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM WATER INITIATIVE:
MANAGING OUR FUTURE WATER NEEDS FOR AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, HUMAN
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (Draft for Discussion at World Economic
Forum Annual Meeting 2009). According to the report:
In many places around the world, we have consistently under-priced
water, wasting and overusing it as a result. We have depleted stocks
of groundwater at the expense of our future water needs. In effect, we
have enjoyed a series of regional water “bubbles” to support economic
growth over the past 50 years or so, especially in agriculture. We are
now on the verge of water bankruptcy in many places with no way of
paying the debt back. In fact, a number of these regional water bubbles are now bursting in parts of China, the Middle East, the southwestern U.S. and India.
Id.
8. Id.
9. See Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res., 83 Cal.
THE
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adheres to the “prior appropriation doctrine,” and allocates wa10
ter under the principle of “first in time, first in right.” The
oldest water rights, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century
11
in some watersheds, lock up a significant portion of the water
12
supply in perpetuity. The supply is stretched further by
drought, fluctuating precipitation patterns, and climate
13
change. As a consequence, it can be difficult to accommodate
emerging societal values—including environmental protection
and recreation—unless the new users can come up with enough
14
money to buy out their predecessors. In short, the rules of the
game were set well over a century before we fully appreciated
the importance of saving some water for the natural environment and for other nonconsumptive uses.
Overall, there is an increasing recognition that the solution
lies in reallocating some of the water supply to support critical
values, such as environmental preservation and the prevention
of species extinction. Bedrock principles of water law—
including the requirement of “beneficial use” and the public
15
trust doctrine —support reallocation. But any such attempt
runs up against fierce resistance from those who hold the oldest
water rights and who are entitled to protection under the con16
cept of priority, a competing core principle of water law. In a
titanic struggle for dominance between those foundational con17
cepts, priority has been losing ground. But it has been doing
so outside the context of traditional state water institutions.
Rather, priority has been giving way as frustrated stakeholders
engage in voluntary, collaborative negotiations to find a new
App. 4th 892, 913–15 (2000) (noting the “aura of unreality” surrounding paper
water rights and describing their value, in some cases, as worth “little more
than a wish and a prayer”); see also infra Part I.B.
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See Concerning the Recognition of Acequias, and, in Connection
Therewith, Authorizing Acequia Ditch Corporations, ch. 168, 2009 Colo. Sess.
Laws 739 (2009) (“The oldest water right in Colorado is attributed to the San
Luis People’s Ditch, with a priority date of April 10, 1852.”); Lux v. Haggin, 10
P. 674 (Cal. 1886), superseded by rule as stated in Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v.
All Parties & Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 597 (1957) (recognizing appropriative rights
in California); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882) (recognizing
appropriative rights in Colorado).
12. See also infra note 91 and accompanying text.
13. See 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws iii, vii.
14. See also infra Part I.C.1.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.C.1.
17. See infra Part I.C.2.

564

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:560

18

way to stretch precious water supplies. Bargaining in the
shadow of the priority doctrine, numerous watershed groups
19
have convened throughout the West. But collaborative efforts
are not a panacea, and stakeholders face a new set of challenges and questions. Most importantly, if the limitations of priority have prompted some stakeholders to move beyond traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, what concepts should fill the
void? With considerable effort, these groups have developed
20
varying ad hoc processes to guide their negotiations. They
have reinvented the wheel time and again, adjusted for the
21
unique circumstances of their watersheds. But unease remains, as collaborators struggle to harmonize their common
history of priority allocation with the possibility of reallocation
22
and shared sacrifice.
In short, collaborators are in desperate need of a consistent
conceptual framework to guide their efforts. To accommodate
both the rhetoric of priority and the reality of reallocation, this
Article develops the new concept of “water bankruptcy.” In so
doing, this piece draws on the mechanisms and principles of
federal bankruptcy law, a regime comfortable with both priority-based claims and shared loss. Just as traditional bankruptcy
law provides a time-tested, comprehensive, and well-reasoned
model that gives debtors a fresh start under dire circumstances, so too might water bankruptcy assist states in restructuring
debts and reallocating assets related to society’s most precious,
life-sustaining, and irreplaceable resource. And just as insolvent corporations and individuals emerge financially healthier
from financial bankruptcy, so also might healthier watersheds
result from water bankruptcy proceedings.

18. See World Heads for “Water Bankruptcy,” Says Davos Report, AFP,
(Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gw8a
FWD0HjsLXr1cBCf4HlI079zg (last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (quoting Indra Nooyi,
chairman and chief executive of PepsiCo, Inc., who asserted at the 2009 World
Economic Forum, “[t]he only way to measurably and sustainably improve this
dire situation is through broad-scale collaborative efforts between governments, industry, academic, and other stakeholders around the world”).
19. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., 2011 Action Agenda Update: Strategy Development Points of
Contact, PUGET SOUND PARTNERSHIP (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www
.mypugetsound.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=175&
Itemid=172.
21. See, e.g., Watershed Issues, CINEGA WATERSHIP PARTNERSHIP,
http://www.cienega.org/watershed-issues/#water (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
22. See id.
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Part I presents an overview of the prior appropriation doctrine and argues that the concept of priority is at the breaking
point, no longer able to allocate water reliably under all circumstances. Overall, the system makes too many promises, but
too few actual deliveries of water, driving some water users to
the bargaining table.
Part II surveys the broad range of tools that states currently employ to stretch insufficient water supplies, sometimes constituting an implicit reallocation that departs from strict priority. Adding to the existing literature, this Part attempts a
comprehensive cataloguing of state techniques, and aligns
them along a logical continuum that considers who bears the
cost of reallocation. At one end of the sequence lay the seniors
pay options—methods by which administrators cut back senior
water rights to provide water for emerging societal values such
23
as recreation and environmental protection. These tools tend
to emphasize the public aspect of water. They depend on enforcement of the beneficial use, reasonable use, and public trust
doctrines—fundamental principles that restrict water rights to
the efficient, non-wasteful, beneficial uses of a common resource. At the other end of the continuum, the juniors pay options call for new users to buy out, compensate, or otherwise
yield to older water uses. These options stress the private aspect of water and its status as a property right. This Part identifies the conditions under which each set of tools work well,
and the circumstances under which each falls short.
Finally, Part III introduces the new concept of “water
bankruptcy.” By drawing an analogy to the well-developed
principles of bankruptcy law, this Article offers a systematic,
regularized way of thinking about a collection of place-specific,
sui generis processes independently springing up across the
West. Reducing the need for collaborators to invent a process
and rationale anew in each case, this Article offers a common
vocabulary and framework to encourage the development of an
inter-state knowledge base of best practices for collaborative
processes. In particular, this section looks to Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which provides a “fresh start” for insolvent
municipalities by allowing them to develop a plan for reorganization that readjusts the debts that they owe. The discussion
recognizes the similarity of municipal insolvency and the
states’ overallocation of water resources. Like western water
23. See infra Part II.A.
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law, bankruptcy is grounded in principles of priority. But unlike water law, bankruptcy explicitly permits a departure from
strict priority when circumstances so warrant. Bankruptcy’s
“reset button” recognizes that other social values—such as saving debtors from ruin and allowing them to hold back the assets
necessary for their survival—can sometimes affect creditors’
expectations of payment. Likewise, water bankruptcy would
mediate the law’s internal struggle between beneficial use and
priority and allow state water managers to bring back overstressed aquatic systems from the brink of collapse.
Notably, this Article is not advocating the widespread replacement of state administration with stakeholder consensus,
or the wholesale replacement of priority with shared loss. Rather, this Article draws on principles of traditional bankruptcy to
provide a systematic framework for willing collaborators who
have voluntarily turned to negotiation, rather than traditional
judicial or administrative processes, to resolve their water conflicts.
I. THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE AND
SCARCITY
A. THE DOCTRINE
The law of water allocation is primarily state law. State
constitutions and statutes assert broad authority over water as
a public resource to be administered for the benefit of all the
24
people. States allocate to individuals only a “usufructuary”
right—permission to use a specified quantity of water for a spe25
cific purpose. The states retain ultimate ownership or control
26
over the water resources within their borders. As such, water
rights are a unique type of personal property, neither purely
27
private, nor purely public.
24. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 74 –77, 85 (3d ed.
1997) [hereinafter GETCHES, NUTSHELL].
25. CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C. BIRDSONG, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 843–
45, 859–60 (2d ed. 2009).
26. See id.
27. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 235 (1992)
[hereinafter WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN] (“All [western] state
constitutions or statutes declared water to be public, but nearly all water was
appropriated for private gain. Even superficially public uses had heavy private
overtones. The crusades of Los Angeles, Denver, Phoenix, and Albuquerque for
water in fact have been mainly the crusades of forward-looking land developers who had staked out subdivisions on the plains and deserts and who needed
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The prior appropriation doctrine dominates in the states
bisected by, or west of, the hundredth meridian—the longitudinal line that passes through North Dakota, South Dakota, Ne28
braska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. In general, water users must satisfy three requirements before they acquire vested
29
water rights under the appropriation doctrine. First, they
must demonstrate a firm intent to appropriate the unappropri30
ated waters of a natural source. Ill-formed plans can be dis31
missed as mere speculation rather than firm intent, and overutilized watersheds may be deemed insufficient to satisfy the
reasonable expectations created by the grant of a new water
32
right. Next, they must physically divert water from its natural
source to the place of use, which may be in a distant watershed
33
or even across a mountain range. Finally, users must put the
34
water to beneficial use without waste.
Among the three elements, beneficial use has been recognized as the core requirement—what some states refer to as
35
“the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.” Traditionally, beneficial uses included putting water to work for domes36
tic, mining, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes. In
modern times, courts recognize as beneficial such additional
uses as scenic enjoyment, recreation, and environmental protection. As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in 1974:
ample and reliable municipal water supplies to complete their ventures.”);
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17,
17–18 (2011) (conceptualizing water as a “public commodity” to harmonize the
visions of water as commodity, public trust, and human right).
28. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 843–44. Nine states (Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) follow a
“pure” version of the doctrine and nine other western states (California, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and
Washington) recognize a hybrid appropriation/riparian doctrine in which appropriation dominates. DOUGLAS L. GRANT & GREGORY S. WEBER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 7 (8th ed. 2010).
29. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 74.
30. Id. at 89.
31. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeowners’ Ass’n, 14 P.3d 325, 333 (Colo. 2000) (discussing the “can and will” doctrine
set forth in COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (2000)).
32. Id. (recognizing that applications for conditional water rights can be
dismissed for failure to demonstrate sufficient quantities of water available for
appropriation).
33. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 92–97.
34. Id. at 24, 97–100.
35. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.035 (Lexis-Nexis 2012); NEW
MEX. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-3 (1989).
36. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 97.
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[I]f we were now presented with a question of whether or not using
water to operate a public swimming pool, a fountain, or to flood a
tract to provide ice for a skating rink were beneficial uses, a good argument could be presented that such uses, although not [recognized
by the traditional common law] were nevertheless beneficial. But we
cannot say that such uses will always be beneficial because conditions
might so change that these uses would be an unjustifiable use of water needed for other purposes. . . . [T]here is always a possibility
that . . . uses beneficial in one era will not be in another and vice ver37
sa.

Thus, the contours of beneficial use evolve over time to accommodate changed circumstances.
Increasingly, these common-law requirements have been
modified by statute. The diversion requirement has been re38
laxed or eliminated, and many states now recognize nondiversionary “instream flow” water rights to keep water in
39
place to protect the natural environment. Most states have
added a public interest test to the traditional triad of common40
law requirements. Furthermore, the common-law appropriation system itself has been supplanted by administrative per41
mit systems in virtually every western state. Colorado remains the lone exception where users do not need to secure an
administrative permit before making a valid appropriation of
water. Instead, water users in Colorado put water to beneficial
use first, and then go to trial courts known as “water courts” to
demonstrate their compliance with the law and to receive de42
crees granting them water rights with specific priority dates.
As its name indicates, the prior appropriation doctrine re43
wards those who come first. That is, unlike riparian water us37. Idaho Dep’t of Parks v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924,
931–32 (Idaho 1974) (Bakes, J., concurring).
38. See J. Vincent Jones, The Bean Lake Saga: The End of the Diversion
Requirement in Pre-1973 Water Appropriation Claims in Montana, 7 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 64, 68 (2003) (discussing this in the context of
Montana).
39. Charlton H. Bonham, Perspectives from the Field: A Review of Western
Instream Flow Issues and Recommendations for a New Water Future, 36
ENVTL. L. 1205, 1207 (2006). See generally Symposium, Western Instream
Flows: Fifty Years of Progress and Setbacks, 36 ENVTL. L. 1 (2006) (examining
the development of instream flow rights and obstacles to their implementation, the interplay of federal and tribal instream flow protection with state water law, and innovative approaches for the future of instream rights; each author discusses the issue of instream rights from his or her area of specialty).
40. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 860, 872–73.
41. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 7, 88–89.
42. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 860.
43. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 78.
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ers in the East who share the loss in times of shortage, western
appropriators exercise their water rights in order of temporal
priority. The person who made the first appropriation from a
particular watercourse—known as the senior water user—may
satisfy her water right in full before so-called junior appropria44
tors receive a single drop of water.
B. TOO MANY PROMISES, TOO LITTLE WATER
The appropriation system’s reliance on the principle of first
come, first served has produced a curious semantic distinction.
In water parlance, the phrase “paper water rights” refers to the
newest entitlements. These rights are so junior that it is rarely
their turn to receive water. In dry years—or even in average
45
years—the last users in line may not receive any water at all.
In contrast, only the more reliable senior water rights are ca46
pable of consistently yielding the legal right to “wet water.” It
is true that even the most junior water rights may allow their
holders to fill reservoirs or recharge aquifers in rare years of
47
abundance. Nevertheless, the practice of overappropriation
encourages an optimistically skewed perception of the suffi48
ciency of existing water supplies. As a result, for example,
planners might be tempted to approve more development than
49
the existing water supply can support reliably. As the California Court of Appeals explained, “[t]hus, where land use planning determinations can be made on the basis of entitlement
rather than real water, development can outpace the availability of water, leading to detrimental environmental consequences, excessive groundwater pumping, and pressure to develop
50
additional water supplies.” Overall, the prevalence of oxymo-

44. Id. at 101.
45. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 860, 872–73.
46. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 27, at 240
(“What if the stream were already fully appropriated? Grant the permit anyway; give the junior a ‘paper right.’ The juniors will not get any wet water, except in an unusually high year, but they need priority status in case they get
together and have a dam built. Thus, the mission of the water agencies was to
serve the bidding of the rights holders . . . . [G]overnment was enlisted purely
to solidify private rights to a public resource. These were captured agencies in
the most extreme sense.” (footnote omitted)).
47. See id.
48. See generally Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res.,
83 Cal. App. 4th 892, 914 (2000) (referring to paper water as an “illusion”).
49. Id.
50. Id.

570

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:560

ronic waterless water rights is evidence that the long-revered
edifice of priority has been pushed to its limit.
To outsiders, it strains logic that administrators continue
to issue water rights that rarely, if ever, yield water. But to
westerners, paper water rights may provide satisfying evidence
that the system is working. Indeed, a long line of would-be water users demonstrates that the state has achieved “maximum
utilization” of its scarce water resources—the idea that as
many users as possible should be allowed to put the state’s wa51
ter to work. In 1968, the Colorado Supreme Court refused to
uphold an injunction against the pumping of a junior well, even
though its operation likely interfered with senior water users
52
diverting from a nearby river. To justify this departure from
strict priority, the court cited to a competing principle, that of
“maximum utilization.” Finding this principle implicitly rooted
in the state constitution, the court explained, “[a]s administration of water approaches its second century the curtain is opening upon the new drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that doctrine can be integrated into the law of
53
vested rights.” Further, the court articulated, “[w]e have
known for a long time that the doctrine was lurking in the
backstage shadows as a result of the accepted, though oft violated, principle that the right to water does not give the right to
54
waste it.” Under this predilection for maximum utilization, it
is not uncommon to see “fully appropriated,” dry riverbeds in
the West in late summer because the right to use to every last
55
drop of water has been allocated to the fullest extent possible.
Many western water supplies are now beyond full appropriation, instead becoming seriously “overappropriated.” That
is, in some watersheds the cumulative volume of legal water
56
entitlements far exceeds the average annual flow of the river.
51. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968).
52. Id.; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-226 (2003) (“[W]hile the doctrine of
‘first in time is first in right’ is recognized, a reasonable exercise of this right
shall not block full economic development of underground water resources.”
(emphasis added)).
53. Fellhauer, 447 P.2d at 994.
54. Id.
55. See generally David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water
Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the State’s Role?, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 8, 9 (2001) [hereinafter Getches, The Metamorphosis] (asserting that western “rivers became fully appropriated early in the twentieth
century”).
56. Id. at 10–11 (citing DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST:
WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 1848–1902, at 37–38 (1992)).
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The Colorado River, which serves as the lifeblood of seven
states, has been overappropriated since 1922, when an inflated
57
estimate of its flow was the basis of an interstate allocation.
On an intrastate level, many western states have stretched
their rivers to the limit. In Colorado, most surface streams are
58
overappropriated. Likewise, in Idaho—which favors “full economic development” and “optimum use”—water supplies have
been over-allocated so severely that in 2007, almost three thousand junior water users worried that their water rights would
be curtailed unless nature provided snowpack at 105% of nor59
60
mal.
California has also fully appropriated
and
overappropriated many of its watersheds. In the critical BayDelta region, for example, the State Water Board estimated in
2008 that appropriative water rights had a face value of 245
million acre-feet, as compared to an average annual unimpaired flow of approximately 29 million acre-feet. In other
words, the Water Board had overappropriated water rights in
61
62
that basin by up to about 800%.
57. Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeowners’
Ass’n, 14 P.3d 325, 332 n.8 (Colo. 2000) (noting that the Colorado River Compact of 1922 “overestimates the actual quantity of available Colorado River
water during many years, due to variations in rainfall, snowfall, and resulting
run-off”); David H. Getches, Water Management in the United States and the
Fate of the Colorado River Delta in Mexico, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 107, 107–08
(2003) (discussing Colorado River overappropriation).
58. See Derek L. Turner, Comment, Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation
Dist. v. Trout Unlimited and an Anti-Speculation Doctrine for a New Era of
Water Supply Planning, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 639, 646 (2011) (asserting “virtually all surface water is overappropriated” (citing High Plains A & M, LLC v.
Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 721–22 (Colo. 2005) to note
that three out of four of Colorado’s major rivers are overappropriated, and City
of Aurora ex rel. Util. Enter. v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 607 (Colo.
2005) for the proposition that “[t]he South Platte River Basin is substantially
overappropriated”)). See generally Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and its Implications for Collaborative Water Management, 8 NEV. L.J.
994 (2008) (discussing the anti-speculation doctrine).
59. Jennifer M. Carlquist, Conjunctive Management: A New Battle of Priority in Idaho Water Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 143, 144 –45, 169–70 (2008).
60. The State Water Resources Control Board. has designated numerous
streams “fully appropriated” year-round or during specific months. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1205–1207 (West 2009). For a table of fully appropriated
streams, see Fully Appropriated Streams, STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL
BOARD., http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/
fully_appropriated_streams/ (lasted updated Mar. 1, 2009).
61. The magnitude of the apparent overappropriation may be diminished
by a variety of factors, including re-use of water and the necessity of more
than one permit for some water uses in California’s complex diversion and
storage systems. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., WATER RIGHTS WITHIN
THE BAY/DELTA WATERSHED 3–4 (2008).
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Under the appropriation doctrine, the mere grant of a water right does not constitute an absolute guarantee by the state
that every water user, no matter how junior, will be satisfied in
any particular year. In light of uneven levels of annual precipitation, some degree of overappropriation may be necessary to
ensure efficient use of water resources, much like airlines overbook flights and keep a standby list to ensure that no seat goes
63
empty. At the same time, however, water users hold the understandable expectation that their state-granted water rights
64
represent more than an empty token. The line between full
appropriation and overappropriation is a fine one. But at some
point, significant overappropriation indicates a breakdown of
the system and a refusal to recognize natural limits. The massive gap between appropriated water volumes and natural supply suggests that the states are making promises (albeit qualified ones) they cannot keep. In sum, the prior appropriation
doctrine has produced the overappropriated West—a region of
too many promises, too little water.
C. PRIORITY AT THE BREAKING POINT
1. Priority Celebrated
The common-law prior appropriation doctrine is rooted in
scarcity. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, courts in the
dry western states recognized the doctrine as the law of their

62. Id. at 2–3. In such cases, according to the Water Board, the face value
of legal water rights exceeds the volume of water hydrologically available for
use. Id. at 3. In limited circumstances, the Board may continue to grant water
rights, even if the source is fully appropriated. In the case of agricultural projects, for example, the Water Board’s historic practices called for approving
new water rights as long as water was available in at least some of the years.
Id. This practice, together with other current and historic factors, has caused
some stream systems to be overappropriated. See California Water Impact
Network, Central Valley Watershed Over-Appropriation, http://www.c-win.org/
node/67 (last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (asserting that California water agencies
“vastly overcommitted water from the Bay-Delta’s Central Valley watershed
streams”).
63. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., supra note61, at 3 (“[T]he State
Water Board is required to maximize the beneficial use of water.”).
64. See, e.g., In re Hitchcock & Red Willow Irrigation Dist., 410 N.W.2d
101, 108 (Neb. 1987) (determining that for unappropriated water to be available in a practical sense, “the supply of water must be fairly continuous and dependable” (citing Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922))); GRANT & WEBER, supra note 28, at 127–35.
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65

jurisdictions. They rejected riparianism, a competing commonlaw doctrine followed in the wetter eastern states, under which
only those who own so-called riparian lands that abut a natural
66
watercourse have the right to use the adjacent stream or lake.
Instead, western judges celebrated the appropriation doctrine’s
unique ability to allocate precious water resources among users
67
in a parched landscape, regardless of land ownership. They
believed its operating principle—first in time, first in right—
provided an ordering precept and the muscle sufficient to guide
the rough-and-tumble settlement of the West by miners and
68
farmers.
Even the most pragmatic westerner can wax poetic when it
comes to the appropriation doctrine, in general, and the element of priority, in particular. Colorado Supreme Court Justice
Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., who practiced environmental and water
law for decades before his elevation to the bench in 1996, has
69
celebrated the role of priority in numerous talks and writings.
In 2002, he responded to critics of priority in an article titled
70
Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle. He argued that priority would remain at the heart of water policy in
71
the twenty-first century. In fact, priority would ground the
doctrine as it faced modern challenges, including fostering environmental protection and preservation, satisfying recreational demand, enforcing pollution control, and accommodating
72
population growth. In scarcity, Justice Hobbs saw an oppor65. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145–47 (1855); Coffin v. The Left Hand
Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882); Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 565–66
(1872).
66. For a discussion of the dubious legal heritage of the doctrine, see Dale
D. Goble, Prior Appropriation and the Property Clause: A Dialogue of Accommodation, 71 OR. L. REV. 381, 382–84 (1992) (arguing that the prior appropriation doctrine “has a mirage at its core, just like the shimmering waters of the
Great American Desert that danced before the prospector and his cantankerous mule” because western territorial legislatures explicitly adopted the
“common law of England” (riparianism)) and Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution,
Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 268
(1990) (arguing that the “‘pure’ appropriation state of Colorado . . . became
pure only by judicial revisionism in reading the Territorial legislature’s riparian statutes”).
67. See cases cited supra note 65.
68. See id.
69. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in
the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37, 37 (2002).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 50–55.
72. See id.
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tunity: the chance for community resolution of the tension between vested priorities to the beneficial use of water and the
demand for new uses in accordance with “the changing customs
73
and values of the people.” In conclusion, Justice Hobbs’s prose
gave way to poetry:
The two chambers of the western heart, the two lobes of the western
mind, are beneficial use and preservation. Growth and glorious natural habitat, this is the heritage of the public domain. Our rapidly urbanizing western experience is bridled by our love for the vistas, rivers, and all life, our natural optimism, and our need for each other. In
this our western place, so prized by the entire country, shall carry us
74
forward.

Justice Hobbs was not alone as he penned his ode to priority.
Numerous other jurists, administrative officials, and scholars
share his reverence for one of the foundational principles of
western water law.
In 1855, the California Supreme Court recognized in Irwin
v. Phillips that “a universal sense of necessity and propriety
[had] so firmly fixed [the priority principle] as that [it had]
come to be looked upon as having the force and effect of res ju75
dicata.” The court called for protection of the rights of miners
and others “who, by prior appropriation, have taken the waters
from their natural beds, and by costly artificial works have
conducted them for miles over mountains and ravines, to sup76
ply the necessities of gold diggers . . . .” Without legal protection of their expectations, the court warned that “the most important interests of the mineral region would remain without
77
development.”
Like California, Colorado has long praised priority as an
allocation principle. In the 1882 case of Coffin v. Left Hand
Ditch Co., the Colorado Supreme Court emphatically declared
the eastern riparian doctrine inapplicable in its state, fearing
78
that to do otherwise would invite disaster.
Citing an
79
“[i]mperative necessity” unknown in wetter climates, the
court held that the first user of water from a natural stream for
a beneficial purpose has a prior right to the use of the water as
against all competing claimants. As the court explained,
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at 53–55.
Id. at 55.
5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855).
Id.
Id.
6 Colo. 443, 446–47 (1882).
Id.
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“[h]ouses have been built, and permanent improvements made;
the soil has been cultivated, and thousands of acres have been
rendered immensely valuable, with the understanding that ap80
propriations of water would be protected.” It concluded with
an ominous warning: “Deny the doctrine of . . . superiority of
right by priority of appropriation, and a great part of the value
81
of all this property is at once destroyed.”
Similar to judges, western water administrators embrace
priority, sometimes with a mixture of practicality and optimism. In a 2002 address to a group of water lawyers, Wyoming
State Engineer Patrick T. Tyrrell rejected the views of those
who “portray the priority system in Wyoming and the West as a
vestige of its former self, a system whose applicability has diminished along with the importance of the chuck wagon and
82
the wheelwright . . . .” He suggested that critics “might enjoy
the analogous definition of democracy: it’s the worst system ev83
er devised by man, except for everything else.” Looking forward to the twenty-first century, Tyrrell expressed confidence
in priority’s adaptive abilities. He asked “where is water law
84
headed in Wyoming?” Responding to his own question, Tyrrell
responded, “Nowhere. By that, I mean I believe the priority
system must remain. It becomes more flexible as it gets older . . . . For example, although ‘beneficial use’ historically required physical diversion or storage of water, instream flows
have been recognized by statute since 1986 as a beneficial
85
use.” He added wryly, such flexibility represents “an evolu86
tionary trait we humans can envy.”
Like judges and administrators, scholars have touted the
virtues of priority. Many point to the relatively secure property
rights that emerge from the priority system, giving senior water users enough confidence in the stability of their water
rights to invest in water-dependent enterprises, thereby secur87
ing optimal development of the West. Many others note that
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Patrick T. Tyrrell, Wyoming Water Law: Priority, Drought and the
North Platte River, WYO. LAWYER, June 2002, at 33.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 48.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., CHARLES J. MEYERS, NAT’L WATER COMM’N, LEGAL STUDY
NO. 1: A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 3–6 (1971); FRANK J. TRELEASE, NAT’L WATER COMM’N, LEGAL STUDY NO.
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the prioritization of water rights is an essential prerequisite to
the development of “water markets” capable of reallocating wa88
ter rights to accommodate changing societal needs. Others
would extend the benefits of priority further, as by fully privatizing that portion of an appropriator’s usufructuary right
89
equivalent to its historic beneficial consumptive use. Still other scholars have called for the extension of appropriation’s priority principle into new areas of dispute. When the Endangered
Species Act imposes liability on water users for jeopardizing
listed species or adversely modifying critical instream habitat,
one scholar argues that the water users’ relative priorities
should be the basis of any determination of proximate cause
90
and allocation of responsibility among diverters.
2. Priority Questioned
As described in the previous section, many wax poetic
about the virtues of priority. But others believe that priority
poses an obstacle to modern water use because it has “frozen”
scarce water resources into low-value uses, including certain
agricultural practices that are no longer highly valued by socie91
ty. As a result, these critics argue, the influence of priority is
waning and should continue to wane as it proves insufficient to
92
tackle modern challenges. Doubts about the continued viability of priority—at least in its absolute form—fall into four cate5: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 5–6 (1971). Both of these excerpts are cited in GRANT & WEBER, supra note 28, at 9–11. See also TERRY L.
ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE
PUMP 33–34 (1997); Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design
of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 427–430 (1995).
88. See infra Part II.C.
89. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Public Water-Private Water: AntiSpeculation, Water Reallocation, and High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy District, 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 15–19
(2006).
90. James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on
Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 620–23
(2003).
91. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 101–02; A. Dan Tarlock, The
Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769,
770–72 (2001) [hereinafter Tarlock, The Future] (recounting the evolution of
prior appropriation and criticisms that perpetual rights “lock too much water
into marginal agriculture and generally encourage inefficient off-stream consumptive uses to the detriment of aquatic ecosystem values and the needs of
growing urban areas”).
92. See infra Part I.C.2.
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gories. As discussed below, critics challenge the purity of priority’s claimed historical pedigree; question the modern doctrine’s
adherence to priority in practice; chronicle non-priority water
uses specifically approved under the doctrine; and list other
federal and state laws that may have eclipsed the influence of
93
priority. In fact, in 1991, one scholar notably proclaimed the
94
death of prior appropriation.
First, legal historians have begun to question the very
foundations of the doctrine. According to traditional lore, eastern water law allowed a relative few riparian landowners to
95
monopolize the use of water resources. Appropriation, the story continues, broke ranks with such monopolistic tendencies by
allowing anyone to make a valid appropriation of water, re96
gardless of land ownership, and regardless of wealth. But
some legal historians have countered this egalitarian genesis
97
story. Instead, they have documented a contrarian history
that grounds the appropriation doctrine in concerns other than
98
widespread opportunity, economic growth, and efficiency.
These historians suggest that the doctrine was borne out of
99
a concern for distributive justice and fairness. According to
this view, priority was neither the “cornerstone” of early water
law in states including Colorado, nor was it an “absolute
100
rule.” Instead, it was of an “auxiliary nature” that was subor101
dinate to other concerns. For example, some state constitutions recognize that preference, not priority, might guide cer102
tain allocation decisions.
As such, in times of shortage,
administrators might favor domestic over agricultural use and

93. See id.
94. See Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation 1848–
1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v, v (1991) [hereinafter Wilkinson, In Memoriam].
95. David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice
in the Creation of Property Rights, 32 ECOL. L.Q. 3, 7–10 (2005) (referring to
the consensus view as “mythical” and “contradicted by the historical evidence”).
96. See id.; Sax, supra note 66.
97. See Schorr, supra note 95, at 7–10.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 53–54; see also Samuel C. Wiel, “Priority” in Western Water Law,
18 YALE L.J. 189, 189 n.3 (1909).
101. See Schorr, supra note 95, at 53–54.
102. Id. at 44 –45; see also GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 103–06
(discussing the relationship between preferences and priority).
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agricultural use over industrial use—rather than relying on the
103
order in which water rights were initiated.
As early as 1909, eminent water scholar Samuel C. Wiel
104
argued that priority’s importance had been exaggerated. Examining a half-century of case law, Wiel explained, “there has
always been a minority current of authority contending that
the exclusiveness of a prior right should be recognized only to a
certain degree, and that priorities should not be enforced when
to do so would be ‘unreasonable’ to water users upon the same
105
stream, though subsequent in time of use.” Looking forward,
Wiel observed:
[T]he “exclusiveness” rule of priority comes more and more in conflict
with the community idea. Justice is coming more and more to demand
an equitable co-relation of the users for the common good, and these
changed conditions have caused here and there revivals of the idea
that the priority must be reasonable . . . or it will not be fully en106
forced.

Wiel predicted “a weakening of the strict rule of priority” and
the growth of what might be called “the principle of unreasona107
ble priority.”
As a second challenge to priority, observers have documented the failure of administrators to enforce the principle
consistently. Some scholars note the irony of the diminishing
practical significance of priority in the implementation of the
doctrine that bears its name. Professor Dan Tarlock has argued
108
that “priority enforcement is more bluff than substance . . . .”
He lists numerous circumstances in which priority is not followed, including the administration of some irrigation water
rights, the practice of “water spreading” to non-authorized
places of use, general stream adjudications, the municipal “super-preference,” and the regulation of users (such as Arizona
109
and California) that hold large blocks of water. Tarlock sug103. See GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 104 –06.
104. Wiel, supra note 100, at 190.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 194 (quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 198.
108. A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76
N.D. L. REV. 881, 883 (2000) [hereinafter Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?].
109. Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91, at 778–85; see also id. at 775–78
(describing priority as a “shadow doctrine” and presenting “scattered empirical
evidence” in support of contention that “priority exists more as a threat than
an actual enforcement practice”). Further, Tarlock questions whether the enforcement of priorities contributes meaningfully to the doctrine’s underlying
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gests that equitable sharing and cooperation, not priority, dom110
inate in actual practice. As he explains, “[p]riority’s modern
significance lies in the threat of enforcement rather than the
actual enforcement because it encourages water users to cooperate either to reduce the risk of enforcement to as close to zero
as possible or to share more equitably the burdens of shortag111
es.” Overall, he concludes, “[i]t is perhaps more accurate to
describe prior appropriation as an extreme default rule of de112
creasing marginal importance.”
As a third line of departure from the rhetoric of priority,
some chronicle the circumstances under which the modern doctrine specifically permits—and sometimes embraces—nonpriority administration of water rights. Recognized priority exceptions include the doctrines of full economic development,
beneficial use, reasonable use, absence of waste, optimum use,
113
114
futile calls, and plans for augmentation.
In the case of
groundwater, many states do not call for strict priority enforcement. If they did, a handful of large-volume senior appropriators could insist on maintaining historic aquifer levels,
115
thereby rendering entire aquifers off-limits to anyone else.
Further, the need for priority administration can be reduced by
the construction of large storage reservoirs that add year-round
116
security to water rights. Moreover, experiments with rainwagoal, which he describes as “the protection of investment-backed expectations
from the risks of variable water years and perhaps now global climate
change.” Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 108, at 883–84.
110. See Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 108, at 883.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 894; see also Michael C. Blumm, The Rhetoric of Water Reform
Resistance: A Response to Hobbs’ Critique of Long’s Peak, 24 ENVTL. L. 171,
186 (1994) (“The current system of water allocation suffers from poor enforcement, little citizen involvement, and virtually eschews comprehensive planning entirely.”); Getches, The Metamorphosis, supra note 55, at 9 (discussing
the passage of the era “when the key issues could be refereed by an official
who enforced simple priorities among rights holders”).
113. See generally Carlquist, supra note 59 (discussing concepts such as
full economic development, beneficial use, reasonable use, absence of waste,
optimum use, and futile call).
114. Part II.A discusses plans for augmentation.
115. See, e.g., Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91, at 777 (“The [priority]
doctrine has endured in part because it is able to accommodate new users and
to adapt to the increasing scale of use.”); see also Carlquist, supra note 59, at
161–70 (describing conjunctive management in Idaho of surface water and
groundwater, and analyzing the role of priority in such management).
116. Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91, at 778 (arguing that “the costs of
enforcing prior rights are often likely to be unacceptably high, unfair, and disruptive of established uses” and citing to the example of California, “which is
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ter harvesting allow juniors, under limited circumstances, to
capture and use precipitation, effectively jumping in line ahead
of seniors who rely on that runoff to replenish the streams and
117
aquifers that supply their senior entitlements.
Fourth, some scholars have noted the diminishing role of
state law in the allocation of western water resources. Indeed,
the late David Getches argued in 2001 that state control over
water resources had long been a “myth” that depended on a
“precarious . . . congressional forbearance in the exercise of fed118
eral preemption.” Increasingly, Getches argued, the states’
role was eclipsed by federal influence in areas such as the fed119
eral reclamation program, the protection of endangered spe120
cies, and federal statutes including the Clean Water Act,
Clean Air Act, Federal Land Policy and Management Act, and
121
the National Forest Management Act. Such federal actions,
Getches noted, joined forces with a series of local, place-based,
122
stakeholder-participatory reform efforts. Overall, the “most
important innovations in water policy in the 1990s have occurred in response to federal pressure and local initiatives, and
almost entirely outside the legislatures and courts of the west123
ern states.” Getches concluded:
Although sweeping state institutional reforms are theoretically possible, the experience of the recent past suggests that the most promising advances in the foreseeable future will continue to be ad hoc, outside-the-box, responses to problems arising in specific geographic
areas. Unless states can muster the will to embrace reform when the
opportunities arise, the federal government along with these local
124
groups will continue to foment constructive change.

Taken together, such deviations from priority enforcement
prompted law professor Charles Wilkinson’s famous 1991 pro-

famous for solving water allocation problems by constructing a massive water
infrastructure and allocating water by large blocks, rather than by adjudicating and enforcing priorities”).
117. See Stephen N. Bretsen, Rainwater Harvesting Under Colorado’s Prior
Appropriation Doctrine: Property Rights and Takings, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 159, 159–60 (2011) (discussing the illegality of rainwater harvest in Colorado prior to the 2009 passage of COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-105(1)(f ) and 3792-602(1)(g)).
118. Getches, The Metamorphosis, supra note 55, at 8.
119. Id. at 13–14.
120. Id. at 14 –18.
121. Id. at 17–18.
122. Id. at 42–52.
123. Id. at 42.
124. Id.
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nouncement of the death of prior appropriation. In a provocative article titled In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation 1848–
1991, Professor Wilkinson anthropomorphized Mr. Prior Appropriation as a “grand man [who] led a grand life—by any
standard he was one of the most influential people in the histo126
ry of the American West.” Among Prior’s accomplishments,
Wilkinson listed his ability to weather the challenges posed by
127
changing public interest standards, to support the develop128
ment of numerous communities throughout the West, and to
oversee the great dam-building era of the middle-twentieth
129
century. In the end, though, Prior’s inability to change and
130
his contempt for limits proved to be his undoing. In the words
of Prior’s imagined wife, Prior was sometimes wrong, and “his
wrong-headedness increased over the years. It seems he just
couldn’t change—he was so set in his ways, because he believed
131
so deeply in his convictions.”
In sum, as the priority system faces the challenges of environmental protection, climate change, and regional population
growth, it has been stretched to the point that the simple concept of “first come, first served” is not sufficient to defuse all
conflicts. The pressing need for certainty may drive even senior
stakeholders to the bargaining table when they are so frustrated with the status quo that they are willing to forgo some of the
benefits of their seniority in exchange for the promise of increased certainty, reliability, or other perceived advantages.
This reduced reliance on the priority system creates a decisional void and requires the parties to negotiate an alternate paradigm to achieve a sustainable allocation of water in the face of
scarcity.

125. Wilkinson, In Memoriam, supra note 94, at v.
126. Id. at v.
127. Id. at ix–x.
128. Id. at xvii–xviii.
129. Id. at xv.
130. Id. at xvi and xvii.
131. Id. at xvii; see also WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra
note 27, at xi–xiii (describing the prior appropriation doctrine as one of the
“lords of yesterday” still dominated by the thinking of another century that
“simply do not square with the economic trends, scientific knowledge, and social values in the modern West”).
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II. THE REALLOCATION CONTINUUM: FOLLOW THE
MONEY

The Seniors Pay

The Juniors Pay

PRIVATE

PUBLIC

As water supplies have been stretched to satisfy increasing
demand, the western faith in priority has been tested. Many
continue to believe that priority can allocate water fairly and
132
efficiently among diverse users. Others worry that scarcity
threatens to overwhelm the system, and charge priority with
“locking up” the oldest, most reliable water rights into uses,
such as inefficient agricultural practices, that no longer serve
133
society well. Increasingly, both camps have embraced the
134
need for some reallocation of water rights, using tools that
135
range from water markets to the public trust doctrine.

This Part introduces a comprehensive cataloguing of the
techniques that states have employed to reallocate water. In an
132. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing how limitations inherent in the doctrine, though rarely enforced, may provide tools for reexamining water usage).
133. See infra Part II.A.4 (contrasting the potential of the public trust doctrine as a reallocation tool with the reality of the public trust doctrine).
134. See WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 27, at 287
(arguing that “[t]he possibilities of reallocation without undue hardship are so
great in part because the waste and excessive use are so great”); Holly
Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dynamic Water Management in the American West, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 55, 58, 60–62
(2008) (discussing how climate change creates the need for water redistribution and evaluating the challenges to a dynamic approach to water reallocation); George A. Gould, Conversion of Agricultural Water Rights to Industrial
Use, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1791, 1791–92 (1982) (arguing that when
industries need new water supplies, they can either “develop new sources of
water or . . . transfer water from an existing use” and concluding that “water
reallocation should begin to occur before all water is allocated; reallocation is
less costly privately and socially”), quoted in GRANT & WEBER, supra note 28,
at 11; Douglas L. Grant, Collaborative Solutions to Colorado River Water
Shortages: The Basin States’ Proposal and Beyond, 8 NEV. L.J. 964, 993 (2008)
(expressing hope for interbasin reallocation to cope with the growing imbalance between water supply and demand); Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91,
at 778–81 (discussing alternatives to a strict priority system).
135. See infra Part II.B.
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effort to bring order to the various instruments rattling inside
state tool boxes, the discussion aligns reallocation options along
a logical continuum that considers who bears the cost of reallocation. At one end of the sequence lay the seniors pay options—
methods by which administrators cut back senior water rights
to provide water for emerging societal values such as recreation
136
and environmental protection. These tools tend to emphasize
the public aspect of water, restricting water rights to efficient,
non-wasteful, beneficial uses of a common resource. At the other end of the continuum, the juniors pay options call for new
users to buy out, compensate, or otherwise yield to older water
137
uses, even if the older uses are of marginal social utility. These options stress the private aspect of water as a type of property right.
In addition to the continuum, accompanying schemata
identify circumstances under which each grouping of tools
works best and circumstances under which each grouping is
contraindicated. Although seniors pay regulatory options work
well in some situations, laxity of enforcement has strengthened
seniors’ sense of absolute entitlement, which has provided fur138
ther support for an unspoken culture of non-enforcement.
Similarly, although juniors pay tools are useful in some cases,
the development of water markets has been hindered by unexpected inefficiencies, transaction costs, and third-party im139
pacts; and the compensation of seniors through the regulatory takings doctrine has produced an analytically incoherent
140
line of inconsistent judicial opinions. After laying out both
ends of the reallocation continuum, this Part concludes that
additional viable solutions may lie in the middle, in the context
of voluntary stakeholder negotiations. Part IV takes up that
middle path in more detail, introducing the concept of “water
bankruptcy.”
A. THE SENIORS PAY
Although the priority system recognizes superior rights in
a watershed’s first appropriators, a number of built-in doctrinal
controls render this superiority less than absolute in particular
136. See infra Part II.A.
137. See infra Part II.B.
138. Cf. supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text (discussing the effects
of the culture of non-enforcement on priority).
139. See infra notes 194–200 and accompanying text.
140. See infra Part II.B.3.
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circumstances. Some of the limitations bow to reality by recognizing physical and historical constraints or tailoring priority
administration to the unique characteristics of groundwater.
Others strive to give meaning to the doctrine’s core element—
beneficial use. Still others reflect the public-private tension inherent in the allocation of water, and adjust the latter in the
141
name of the former. Overall, however, the seniors pay mechanisms tend to be under-enforced. As one scholar has noted in
the context of the Pacific Northwest, states routinely elevate
protection of established uses over limitations inherent in the
priority doctrine, including prohibitions against non-use, waste,
142
and expansion of use.

141. See Sax, supra note 66, at 281 (claiming that western allocation systems operated to elevate the private aspect of water over the public aspect).
142. Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Establishes
Water Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation,
28 ENVTL. L. 881, 883 (1998).
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1. Navigating the Nuances of Priority
Administrators are charged with enforcing water rights in
146
order of priority. However, they will not automatically shut
143. Id. at 891, 893–95 (discussing political limitations on restricting senior users).
144. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 732
(Cal. 1983).
145. See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028–29 (Colo. 1979) (rejecting
the application of the public trust doctrine to non-navigable watercourses).
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down junior appropriators whenever seniors “call” for satisfac147
tion of their water rights. Instead, administrators consider a
variety of physical factors, including the flow of the stream, the
relative saturation of the stream bed, and the lag time between
148
junior shut-off and potential senior delivery. If administrators conclude that it is not physically possible to deliver water
to seniors in usable quantities, then they will deem the call “fu149
tile” and decline to curtail junior users. Historically, however,
administrators have been loath to deviate from the priority system, even if it would take heroic efforts to deliver a slight volume of water to a calling senior. For example, in one extreme
case cited frequently in water law casebooks, the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized the right of downstream senior appropriators to call for their water, even though stream conditions
required “approximately 700 second-feet of water at North
Platte to deliver 162 second-feet at the headgate of the Kearney
150
canal when the river bed is wet.” That is, water administrators would shepherd relatively large volumes of past upstream
juniors’ diversion points in order to deliver only a small volume
to the downstream seniors (the difference would be lost to
seepage, evaporation, and the like). The court suggested that
administrators should take care to avoid departures from priority enforcement and should resist declaring senior calls futile
because that “would clothe . . . officers with a discretion incompatible with the vested interests of the [seniors], and destroy
the very purpose of the doctrine of appropriation existent in
151
this state.” Rather, the court held, the law “does not . . . authorize the administrator of the waters of the stream to refrain
from delivering a usable quantity of water to a senior appropriator because it might appear to him that excessive losses would
152
result.”
Beyond the generally rare circumstance of futile calls, seniors may be systemically curtailed when a court determines
that senior water rights have been impliedly reserved by the
federal government, even if those senior rights have not previ146.
147.
148.
1940).
149.
150.
151.
152.

GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 103–04.
See id.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239, 244 –46 (Neb.
GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 103–04.
Cary, 292 N.W. at 245.
Id. at 247.
Id.
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ously been exercised, quantified, or folded into the states’ ladders of priority enforcement. In the 1908 case of Winters v.
United States, the United States Supreme Court considered the
potential water rights of Native American tribes in Montana
that ceded their ancestral lands to the federal government, reserving to themselves the vastly diminished acreage encom153
passed within the Fort Belknap Indian reservation.
The
Court held that at the time of the reservation, Congress impliedly reserved water rights on behalf of the tribes sufficient to
154
carry out the purposes of the reservation. Later, courts applied the federal reserved water rights doctrine to other types
155
of federal reservations, including national monuments, na156
157
tional forests, national recreation areas, and national wild158
life refuges. Subsequent litigation has quantified federal wa159
ter reservations and determined their priority dates. As a
result, these implied reservations have been made explicit and
moved to the front of the priority line in some watersheds,
thereby cutting back on the amount of water available to exist160
ing seniors.
A third tool that authorizes departure from strict priority
enforcement is the so-called plan for augmentation. Most prominent in Colorado, this mechanism allows junior water users to
make out-of-priority diversions, provided that they replace a
volume of water equivalent to their consumptive use from an
161
alternative source of supply. Often, juniors purchase shares
of reservoir storage water, and substitute releases of this water
162
to make up for their out-of-priority depletions. However, all
153. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908); see also United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (recognizing that a treaty establishing an Indian reservation “was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a
grant of rights from them—a reservation of those not granted”).
154. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
155. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976) (holding that the
1952 Presidential proclamation of Death Valley as a national monument impliedly reserved sufficient water in Devil’s Hole cavern to sustain the unique
“Devil’s Hole pupfish”).
156. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978) (recognizing
that the United States impliedly reserved water rights when it reserved the
Gila National Forest, but limiting the purpose of those reservations to the
primary purposes for which national forests were established).
157. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
158. Id.
159. See GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 330–32.
160. Id.
161. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-137(9), 37-92-308(1)(a) (2011).
162. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 187–88.
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such plans are subject to the requirement that prior appropria163
tors suffer no injury. As a result, although the seniors pay in
theory by foregoing their right to strict priority enforcement,
senior rights are not diminished in any concrete or practical
sense.
2. Managing Groundwater
The physical characteristics of aquifers make it difficult to
164
appropriate groundwater under pure principles of priority.
Whereas surface streams are recharged annually by precipita165
tion, some aquifers may receive very little annual recharge.
As a result, and with the advent of modern technology, it is
generally possible to pump water out of aquifers at a rate that
166
far exceeds recharge. As early as 1973, for example, the National Water Commission reported that the volume of groundwater pumped annually in the continental United States ex167
ceeded recharge by a factor of about forty-six. As a result,
aquifers can be “mined,” much as minerals and other resources
168
are withdrawn from the earth at unsustainable rates. Theoretically, in a pure priority regime, the most-senior appropriator could monopolize an entire aquifer and insist that administrators curtail all other well operators. Otherwise, the senior
would claim, the life of the aquifer would be diminished to the
senior’s detriment.
To avoid this problem, even strict priority jurisdictions
may introduce an element of sharing into their groundwater
regimes—thereby creating a type of seniors pay tool to allow
maximum beneficial use of nonrenewable groundwater re169
sources by a broader range of users. In some cases, for exam163. See, e.g., Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass’n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d 288, 294 (Colo. 1976) (“[U]nder the plans for augmentation . . .
water is available for appropriation when the diversion thereof does not injure
holders of vested rights.”).
164. See generally GRANT & WEBER, supra note 28, at 334 –424.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 350–51 (citing NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE
FUTURE 230 (1973)).
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., Fundingsland v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 468 P.2d 835,
839 (Colo. 1970) (allowing juniors to deplete aquifer to the detriment of seniors, but limiting overall aquifer depletion to a rate of 40% in 25 years);
Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) (refusing to enjoin junior
well pumping, even though its operation likely interfered with senior water
users diverting from a nearby river and justifying the result under the compet-
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ple, seniors may be entitled to protection, but only when junior
pumping threatens “unreasonable” waste or might “unreasona170
bly” affect their prior rights. In other cases, seniors will be
protected, but only to the extent that their wells constitute
“reasonably adequate” means of withdrawal, in light of econom171
ic and historical factors.
3. Requiring Actual and Beneficial Use
Under the appropriation doctrine, water rights that are not
172
used continuously may be declared abandoned. Although intended to promote efficient use of water resources, this use-itor-lose-it threat may create a perverse incentive to waste water. That is, water users face pressure to inflate their actual or
claimed volume of water use to guard against potential charges
173
of abandonment. Despite mechanisms to restrict existing usage to beneficial non-wasteful levels, it is rare that administra174
tors declare water rights to be abandoned or find that exist175
ing practices constitute waste subject to injunction. According
to one scholar, the theoretical prohibition against waste articu176
lated in every state “has been enforced sporadically at best.”
Despite this general laxity of enforcement, at least two contexts provide an opportunity to reexamine the past usage of
ing principle of promoting “maximum utilization” of water resources); see also
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-226 (2003) (“[W]hile the doctrine of ‘first in time is first
in right’ is recognized, a reasonable exercise of this right shall not block full
economic development of underground water resources.” (emphasis added)).
170. Fundingsland, 468 P.2d at 836.
171. City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. 1961).
172. See, e.g., E. Twin Lakes Ditches & Water Works, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 76 P.3d 918, 919 (Colo. 2003) (holding a water right not abandoned
because the evidence was insufficient to conclude that the appropriator intended to abandon the water right).
173. See GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 117–20 (discussing the
common historical practice of overstating water rights).
174. See, e.g., E. Twin Lakes, 76 P.3d at 920 (declining to hold a water right
abandoned even though it had not been exercised for approximately thirty
years). But see N. Kern Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Delta Water Dist., 54 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 578, 601 (Cal. App. 5th 2007) (upholding a declaration of forfeiture).
175. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 119 (concluding that “[a] water
right once manifested in a permit or decree is rarely disturbed”).
176. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 27, at 234 –35.
(“Early on, the rubric of beneficial use also came to encompass the idea that
water, once validly diverted and put to use, could not be wasted. But the language decrying waste was mostly theoretical. It was always difficult to police
waste, and in some cases to define it, so the prohibition against waste, although an announced principle in the cases and statutes of every western state,
has been enforced sporadically at best.”).
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water rights and to trim them back to levels of historically demonstrable, efficient usage. First, water users may seek permission to change one or more attributes of their water rights—
such as point of diversion, place of use, or type of use—while
maintaining their senior priorities. This may occur, for example, in the context of the sale of a water right from one user to
177
another. Most states allow such changes, subject to the “noinjury rule.” In a typical explanation of the rule, the Colorado
Supreme Court explained as early as 1954:
There is absolutely no question that a decreed water right is valuable
property; that it may be used, its use changed, its point of diversion
relocated; and that a municipal corporation is not precluded from
purchasing water rights previously used for agricultural purposes . . .
provided that no adverse effect be suffered by other users from the
178
same stream . . . .

Importantly, despite their seniority, prior appropriators
may not change their water rights if anyone, including juniors,
will suffer injury. As the Colorado court asserted, “junior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream
conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appropriations, and . . . subsequent to such appropriations they may
successfully resist all proposed changes . . . which in any way
179
materially injure[] or adversely affect[] their rights.” To ensure no injury to existing water rights, many jurisdictions reduce changed water rights to their proven historic, nonwasteful consumptive use, which may be substantially less
180
than the ceiling represented by the face value of water rights.
Other jurisdictions go even further by applying complex formulas to determine the amount that should have been necessary
181
to accomplish the users’ stated purposes.
The volume of existing water rights may also be restricted
in the course of proceedings known as “general stream adjudications.” During such proceedings, administrative tribunals
seek to close the gap between the volume of water claimed by
water users (perhaps relying on the face value of their water
permits or water rights) and the volume of water actually
177. See infra Part II.B (discussing water markets).
178. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d
629, 631 (1954).
179. Id. at 631–32.
180. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 118–20.
181. For example, agricultural water rights may be limited to the “duty of
water”—the amount of water per acre necessary to grow specified crops, at
specified altitudes, in specified regions, which is typically statutorily defined.
See GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 121–23.
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182

placed to historic beneficial use. As in change-of-water-right
proceedings, the general stream adjudication may result in the
partial abandonment of water rights to the extent of actual
183
non-use.
4. Protecting Public Values
In some states—most notably California, among western
states—water rights are inherently limited by the public trust
doctrine. In its seminal decision of 1983, the California Supreme Court made clear that the state’s navigable lakes and
streams are subject to the public trust to protect navigation,
commerce, fishing, recreational, ecological, and other public
184
values. According to the court, the state possesses both the
power and the duty to protect trust assets. In the case of water
rights, the court explained, “the state has an affirmative duty
to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses when185
ever feasible.” Even after the state water board issued water
rights, according to the court, the state retained “the power to
reconsider allocation decisions” and, in some cases that power
“extends to the revocation of previously granted [water]
186
rights.” If state agencies fail to act, members of the public can
187
bring a court action to enforce the public trust. Despite the
doctrine’s potential impact and apart from a few high-profile
cases, however, there is very little evidence that California’s
182. See Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 108, at 882–83.
As the author explains:
[T]he enforcement of priorities assumes that adequate use and
streamflow information exists and that there is a speedy curtailment
process. This is seldom the case. There is often a large gap between
the amount of water claimed and the amount of water actually put to
beneficial use, and this makes enforcement difficult. To remedy this
problem, western states such as Arizona, Idaho, and Montana have
invested millions of dollars in general adjudications to quantify rights
so that the system of priorities can actually be fairly and accurately
administered over a century after large claims to water were filed.
Id.
183. See id. (mentioning general adjudications in states including Arizona,
Idaho, and Montana to remedy the problem of “a large gap between the
amount of water claimed and the amount of water actually put to beneficial
use, [which] makes enforcement difficult”).
184. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
185. Id. at 728.
186. Id. at 728, 723.
187. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc. (The Mono Lake
Case), 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2008).
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public trust doctrine has affected the water use of senior rights
188
holders.
B. THE JUNIORS PAY
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context of water rights, particularly when sub-allocated by
contract (takings)

1. Enforcing Priority
The appropriation system requires administrators to satisfy the oldest priority in a watershed before the next-most189
senior user receives any deliveries of water. Thus, by design,
juniors “pay” for any gap between available supply and the face
188. See Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and
the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1104 –05 (2012) (explaining the expansive view of the public trust doctrine from the Mono Lake Case
has been rarely, if ever, used by the courts and is primarily used at the agency
level as a constraint on new rights and uses rather than on established uses).
189. See supra Part I.A.
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value of water rights by assuming the risk of any shortage. As
basins become more and more overappropriated, a larger pool
of juniors with “paper water rights” will bear the cost of any
190
shortage of supply.
2. Managing Groundwater
As discussed above, many jurisdictions that apply the appropriation doctrine to groundwater introduce an element of
sharing, particularly when regulating aquifers that do not receive significant amounts of annual recharge from precipita191
tion. These modifications of priority are designed to prevent a
single senior from commanding exclusive use of an aquifer in
perpetuity. But states applying the appropriation doctrine to
groundwater must balance this undermining of strict priority
with the rights of senior appropriators. To spread the burden of
groundwater shortage, some states insist that seniors use
groundwater efficiently (as by drilling deeper wells, rather than
calling for administrators to curtail junior pumping that lowers
groundwater levels), but only to the extent that such efficient
192
technologies are within the seniors’ “economic reach.”
In
those jurisdictions, it is unlikely that seniors would be required
to deepen their wells as aquifer levels declined if such
193
measures proved financially infeasible.
3. Paying for Water
Water markets. Under appropriate circumstances, water
markets can be helpful in reallocating water among competing
194
users so as to achieve economically efficient use. In some cases, markets may be more politically feasible than regulation
(as, for example, regulations that limit unreasonable or waste190. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Part II.A.2.
192. See, e.g., Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 513 P.2d 627, 637 (Idaho 1973)
(“[S]eniors are not entitled to relief if the junior appropriators, by pumping
from their wells, force seniors to lower their pumps from historic levels to reasonable pumping levels.”); Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d 861, 865
(Utah 1969) (“All users are required, when necessary, to employ reasonable
and efficient means in taking their own waters.”).
193. See, e.g., Fellhauer v. People 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) (“[Seniors]
cannot be required to improve their extraction facilities beyond their economic
reach, upon a consideration of all the factors involved.”).
194. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Water Rights, Markets, and Changing Ecological Conditions, 42 ENVTL. L. 93, 101–02 (2012) (“Insofar as water
rights are currently allocated to comparatively inefficient uses, water markets
can help reallocate water to where there is greater need.”).
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ful water use), because markets are voluntary and rely upon
195
the willing participation of both the buyer and the seller.
However, as several scholars have noted, it is inaccurate to
describe most water transfers (sales, leases, or options) as pure
196
“free market” transactions.
Rather, the transfer of water
rights almost always entails a change in the place of use, the
season of use, the type of use, and/or the pattern of return
197
flows. As a result, water markets have the potential to impact
third parties other than the seller and the buyer, and to subject
198
other water users to negative externalities. To protect the
vested water rights of other users, many states impose a “no in199
jury” rule on transfers. Under this rule, even juniors are protected, because they are entitled to insist on the continuation of
the stream conditions that existed at the time they first made
200
their appropriations. To enforce the “no injury” rule or similar requirements, the states retain regulatory authority over
water markets to limit the volume of water transferred to the
historic consumptive use of water that either has already been
developed and diverted from a stream for beneficial use or has
201
been conserved.
The regulatory takings doctrine. In 2001, the landmark
case Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States
held that federal water-use restrictions imposed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) unconstitutionally deprived plain202
tiff irrigators of water deliveries.
The case involved the
unique situation of water contracts held by California water
districts, which entitled the districts to deliveries of a portion of
195. See id. at 95 (arguing that markets will provide more efficient conservation than government regulation).
196. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right:
The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317,
321 (2000); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 576–77 (2007).
197. See Sinden, supra note 196, at 578–79.
198. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 134, at 63–68.
199. See Monique Dutkowsky, Institutions, Third-Parties and Water Markets: An Analysis of the Role of Water Rights, the No-Injury Rule, and Water
Code 386 on Water Markets in California Counties 6 (Prop. and Env’t Research
Ctr., Workshop Series Paper, 2009), available at http://www.perc.org/files/
Dutkowsky%20water%20markets%20third%20parties.pdf.
200. See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272
P.2d 629, 631–32 (Colo. 1954).
201. See generally Dutkowsky, supra note 199, at 6 (discussing the effect of
the no-injury rule).
202. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl.
313, 319–20 (2001).

2012]

WATER BANKRUPTCY

595

the water yielded under water rights held by state and federal
203
entities. Tulare represented the first case to hold that regulations under the ESA could work a regulatory taking requiring
204
compensation. As a test case, it was unfortunately complicated by the contract/water right dichotomy, leading the court to
conclude that the environmental regulation constituted a
205
“physical” taking of property. The court later retreated from
this position, but left a string of analytically confusing cases in
206
its wake.
C. IMAGINING A MIDDLE PATH
The variety of tools discussed in the previous Part work
well under a range of narrowly tailored circumstances. But, as
many have observed, the primacy of priority is breaking down
207
as scarcity increases. In some cases, administrators refuse to
208
curtail juniors, even when seniors are harmed. In other cases,
juniors suffer, as in severely overappropriated basins where
209
new water rights are either unavailable or represent near210
worthless “paper water rights.” Just as troubling, rhetoric
seldom matches reality. We continue to employ the terminology
of state water law regimes, even as federal laws and local deci211
sions threaten to “eclipse” the states’ role. Some have called
203. See id. at 314 –16.
204. Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 551 (2002) (asserting that “Tulare is the first published court decision holding that efforts to
protect species under the Endangered Species Act constitute a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment”).
205. Tulare Lake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319–20.
206. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 1059 (asserting that after Tulare,
“the courts continued to struggle with the distinction between physical and
regulatory takings, and the distinction between takings and contract violations”). See generally John D. Echeverria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitutional Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579 (2010) (examining the U.S. Supreme
Court’s regulatory takings doctrine decisions); Mark Fenster, The Stubborn
Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525 (2009) (same);
Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOL. L.Q.
307 (2007) (same).
207. See supra Part I.C.
208. See Hobbs, supra note 69, at 43–44.
209. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeowners’ Ass’n, 14 P.3d 325, 333 (Colo. 2000) (precluding the grant of new water
rights where unappropriated supplies are no longer “available” for appropriation).
210. See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
211. See Getches, The Metamorphosis, supra note 55, at 11.

596

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:560

for a middle path, primarily in the context of voluntary negotia212
tions.
Seniors would not be allowed to lock up water resources in perpetuity, but neither would they be demonized for
213
continuing practices once highly valued by society. Juniors
would have an opportunity, like their predecessors, to acquire
214
water rights. They would not bear the entire cost of reallocating water to critical new uses, such as protection of species and
habitat or maintaining water in place for aesthetic and recrea215
tional enjoyment. Most importantly, we would all share the
pain of modernizing the system to reflect current values. The
outlook need not be bleak, as one commentator suggested, because “[t]he possibilities of reallocation without undue hardship
are so great in part because the waste and excessive use are so
216
great.” The next Part considers one promising option for a
negotiated middle path: water bankruptcy.
III. A NEW TOOL: WATER BANKRUPTCY
Whether acknowledged or not, we have already embarked
down a middle path of water management, one in both seniors
and juniors make some compromises in the quest for sustainability, peace, and certainty. Numerous states have convened
stakeholder groups to explore what some have called “out-of217
the-box” solutions to watershed-specific problems.
Seniors,
juniors, regulators, scientists, farmers, fishers, environmentalists, and neighbors have all begun to participate in deciding
218
their common water future.
Although increasingly prevalent, the stakeholder process
poses at least three challenges for participants. First, the willingness to engage in alternative dispute resolution constitutes,
at least implicitly, an admission that the current system is not
working or is otherwise unsustainable. But some participants,
particularly the holders of senior water rights, may fear that
such admission compromises the strength of their claims and
212. See WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 27, at
286–92.
213. See id. at 289.
214. See id. at 290.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 287.
217. Getches, The Metamorphosis, supra note 55, at 55–56 (describing state
encouragement, through legislation and otherwise, of “watershed-based decision making”).
218. Id. at 42–51 (discussing “outside-the-box” reforms, including “macrowatershed initiatives”).
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their bargaining position. Although showing up at a negotiation
suggests a willingness to compromise, those who hold the oldest
water rights will, understandably, be reluctant to affirmatively
relinquish priority as a decisional principle and to substitute a
219
pervasive ethic of shared loss. As Professor Tarlock has observed, “cooperation and ad hoc sharing do not come easily to
water users. Alternative allocation systems usually emerge only when a significant group of water users thinks that cooperation will produce a superior result to the likely legal . . . alloca220
tion of the resource.” As a second challenge, a comprehensive
resolution of competing claims within a particular watershed
requires a similarly comprehensive cataloging of water supply,
water demand, actual water use, and existing water rights,
permits, and contracts. And yet historically, states and water
users—motivated by pragmatic, economic, and tactical concerns—have resisted “showing their hand” and providing such
221
data. As a third challenge, negotiators must make room at
the table for non-traditional participants such as advocates for
environmental, wildlife, and recreational interests. This forces
the group to address tough questions about the interrelation222
ship of environmental and human concerns.
219. As Professor Tarlock has explained, such stakeholder groups are bargaining in the shadow of priority. Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91, at 771
(describing prior appropriation as a “shadow doctrine” under which “[w]ater
rights became more of a general water entitlement to use water rather than
the right to a specific quantity used in a non-wasteful manner as specified by
the formal doctrine”). He elaborates, “[p]riority’s modern significance lies in
the threat of enforcement rather than the actual enforcement because it encourages water users to cooperate either to reduce the risk of enforcement to
as close to zero as possible or to share more equitably the burdens of shortages.” Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 108, at 882–83.
220. Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 108, at 882–83.
221. See, e.g., Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, Managing Water
Demand: Price vs. Non-Price Conservation Programs 23 (Pioneer Inst., White
Paper No. 39, 2007), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rstavins/
Monographs_&_Reports/Pioneer_Olmstead_Stavins_Water.pdf (discussing the
difficulties of obtaining water demand data in agricultural and industrial sectors).
222. As the U.S. Department of the Interior explained:
A common element of many . . . potential crises . . . is the need to provide for water supply for people, cities, and farms in a manner that
also attains the goals of the federal Endangered Species Act. Success
in meeting this challenge almost always requires a collaborative effort
between stakeholders, as is demonstrated by the success of the Upper
Colorado River - San Juan Endangered Fish Recovery Programs.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, WATER 2025: PREVENTING CRISES AND CONFLICT
IN THE WEST 20 (2003), available at http://biodiversity.ca.gov/Meetings/
archive/water03/water2025.pdf. Water 2025 has been incorporated into the
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To provide guidance for this emerging middle collaborative
path, this Part introduces the new concept of “water bankruptcy.” By drawing an analogy to the well-developed principles of
federal bankruptcy law, this Article offers a systematic, regularized way of thinking about a collection of place-specific, sui
generis processes independently springing up across the West
223
and beyond. Reducing the need for collaborators to invent a
process and conceptual basis anew in each case, this Article offers a common vocabulary and framework to encourage the development of an interstate knowledge base of best practices for
collaborative processes. It bears repeating that this Article is
not advocating the widespread replacement of state administration with stakeholder consensus, nor does it advocate the
wholesale substitution of sharing for priority. Rather, the suggestion draws on principles of traditional bankruptcy to provide
a systematic framework for willing collaborators who have voluntarily turned away from traditional processes and toward
negotiation to resolve their water conflicts. Bankruptcy and
Water Conservation Initiative, which has been superseded by the Bureau of
Reclamation’s “WaterSMART” program. See WaterSMARTReclamation: Managing Water in the West: Water 2025, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, http://www.usbr
.gov/WaterSMART/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
223. Watershed groups include: the Puget Sound Partnership, http://www
.psp.wa.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); the Cienega Watershed Partnership,
http://www.cienega.org/who-we-are/svpp-forum/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); the
Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program, http://www
.coloradoriverrecovery.org/general-information/about.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2012); the Lower Colorado Multi-Species Conservation Program, http://www
.lcrmscp.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); and the Great Lakes Commission,
http://www.glc.org/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). See generally James L. Huffman, The Federal Role in Water Resource Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
669, 669, 689 (2008) (“Historically the solution to growing demand was increased supply through storage or transport. Today the only solution in many
cases is shifting water from one use to another. Absent effective local and interstate water markets, these shifts in water use can only be accomplished
through the political process. That is where the collaboration part of the modern approach comes in.”).
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water law negotiations face a remarkably similar challenge: the
situation where debts exceed assets, whether financial or hydrologic. Both seek similar goals: a fresh start for the debtor
and a fair and methodical resolution for the creditors. Both are
grounded in priority, but recognize important, competing values. The concepts—and often, the terminology—are strikingly
similar: both systems contemplate priorities, preferences, risk,
and scarcity.
The following sections provide a brief overview of traditional bankruptcy principles, focusing on those that have a
clear counterpart within the realm of water law negotiations.
Then, the analysis turns to water bankruptcy, examining its
mechanics in detail and noting three contexts for which it is
particularly well suited. Next, the Article presents a case
study—the California Bay Delta. Reviewing decades of unsuccessful efforts in the region, the discussion considers how bankruptcy concepts could provide a useful and practical roadmap
for structuring that collaborative process. Finally, the analysis
teases out the four primary benefits of the water bankruptcy
concept. In sum, the intuitive and apt comparison to bankruptcy law suggests a way forward for water-starved communities
at a stalemate.
A. BANKRUPTCY: THE TRADITIONAL CONTEXT
Bankruptcy is a mechanism designed to give debtors a
224
“fresh start” and to pay off debts in an orderly fashion. As the
United States Supreme Court explained in 1934, “[o]ne of the
primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to ‘relieve the honest
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit
225
him to start afresh . . . .’” Bankruptcy offers fertile ground for
the development of procedures to guide the reallocation of water by stakeholder groups. Like water law, bankruptcy relies on
state law to determine the contours of relevant property rights,
226
such as the debtor’s property and the creditor’s claims.
224. See Bankruptcy, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
225. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v.
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554 –55 (1915)). See generally DAVID
G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL (7th ed. 2005);
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS, BANKR. JUDGES DIV., BANKRUPTCY BASICS (rev. 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY BASICS], available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/BankruptcyReso
urces/bankbasics2011.pdf.
226. EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at 123 (“Unless some federal interest re-
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The Bankruptcy Code establishes six types of bankruptcy
227
mechanisms. The most promising avenue for comparison lies
in Chapter 9 (and various provisions of Chapter 11 specifically
228
incorporated into Chapter 9 ), which applies to municipalities
229
suffering from financial distress. Overall, Chapter 9 provides
municipalities with a stronger measure of control than that
230
provided to debtors under other provisions of the Code. Chapter 9 bankruptcy filings are rare, representing fewer than five
231
hundred cases since congressional authorization in 1937. But
such filings can be noteworthy, as in the case of Orange County, California’s 1994 filing, which involved millions of dollars of
232
debt.

quires a different result, there is no reason why [property rights in the assets
of a bankrupt’s estate] should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”) (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)). Federal law also plays an important role in
bankruptcy, providing uniform, guiding principles and procedures. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1330 (2006). Although federal
law is less prominent in the context of water law, its importance has been increasing to the point that some commentators note its potential to “eclipse”
state water law. See supra notes 118–24 and accompanying text.
227. BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 6. Four types of bankruptcy
likely contain little that is applicable by analogy to the reallocation of water
rights: (1) Chapter 7 liquidation (generally not available to governmental
debtors), see id. at 14; (2) Chapter 12, adjustment of debts of a family farmer
or fisherman with regular annual income, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1231; (3) Chapter
13, adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–1330; and (4) Chapter 15, ancillary and other cross-border cases (involving situation where debtor or its property is subject to the law of a foreign
country), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532.
228. Chapter 11 provides for the reorganization of corporations (and the
repayment of its creditors) that wish to continue operating. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1121–29. Chapter 9 specifically incorporates by reference certain provisions
of Chapter 11. Id. § 901 (applicability of other sections of this title). Most important to judicial confirmation of a plan for reorganization is 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 55.
229. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946.
230. As the Bankruptcy Judges Division explains:
The role of creditors is more limited in chapter 9 than in other cases.
There is no first meeting of creditors, and creditors may not propose
competing plans. If certain requirements are met, the debtor’s plan is
binding on dissenting creditors. The chapter 9 debtor has more freedom to operate without court-imposed restrictions.
BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 52; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (provisions concerning judicial confirmation of a plan for reorganization).
231. BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 49.
232. Id.
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Title 11 defines municipality as a “political subdivision or
233
public agency or instrumentality of a State,” a definition that
fits state water agencies that have over-promised scarce water
234
supplies. To invoke the protection of Chapter 9, a municipali235
ty must be “insolvent,” which means generally that it is “un236
able to pay its debts as they become due” —a situation remarkably similar to the lot of state water agencies that have
overallocated water rights in a particular watershed or aqui237
fer. This type of bankruptcy provides a municipality with the
opportunity to negotiate and develop a plan to reorganize and
238
adjust its debts, a direct analogue to the stakeholder negotiations and water reallocations already familiar in the context of
239
water law. The municipality has broad powers, including the
240
ability to reject executory contracts,
which parallel water
rights and contracts calling for deliveries of water in the fu241
ture.
To invoke bankruptcy protection, a municipality must file a
242
petition for relief. This triggers an automatic stay that prohibits creditors from seeking to enforce their claims against the
243
debtor during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.
The municipal debtor must file a detailed list of its creditors
244
and its debts. Creditors, in turn, must provide specific proofs
of their claims or interests if their debts are disputed, contin245
gent, or unliquidated.
The debtor’s plan will recognize several classifications of
246
interests.
First, the plan will distinguish between “unse-

233. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).
234. For a discussion of overappropriation, see supra Part I.B.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3).
236. Id. § 101(32)(C)(ii). Municipal insolvency also includes the financial
condition where “the municipality is generally not paying its debts as they become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute.” Id.
§ 101(32)(C)(i).
237. See supra Part I.B.
238. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 941–946; see also 11 U.S.C. § 901 (making various
other code sections applicable to chapter 9 bankruptcy).
239. See supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text.
240. BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 53.
241. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
242. 11 U.S.C. §§ 303, 901(a).
243. Id. §§ 362, 922.
244. See id. § 924; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007.
245. See 11 U.S.C. § 925.
246. See id. § 1122.
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247

cured” and “secured” debts. To qualify as a secured creditor
(such as the holder of a mortgage), the claimant must be owed a
debt that can be satisfied by the liquidation of a specific as248
set. In contrast, an unsecured creditor holds a “claim or debt
249
for which a creditor holds no special assurance of payment.”
Further, unsecured claims involve credit that “was extended
based solely upon the creditor’s assessment of the debtor’s fu250
ture ability to pay.”
The debtor’s plan will also separate out claims that are unsecured, yet entitled to special treatment as “priorities” or
251
“preferences.” These priorities represent a codification of interests deemed important to society, such as the payment of
claims for domestic support obligations and contributions to an
252
employee benefit plan. Such priorities also favor essential
pragmatic functions, such as the payment of some administra253
tive expenses of bankruptcy. Importantly, consistent with the
label “priority,” the special status of these interests is correlated to the importance of the interest and not to its historical vin254
tage.

247. See generally id. § 506(a)(1) (section on “determination of secured status”); BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 75 (defining “secured debt” as
“[d]ebt backed by a mortgage, pledge of collateral, or other lien; debt for which
the creditor has the right to pursue specific pledged property upon default”
(emphasis added)).
248. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 75.
249. Id. at 76. Unsecured claims can also arise out of some violation of legal
rights, as in tort. A related concept is that of “undersecured claim[s]” representing a “debt secured by property that is worth less than the full amount of
the debt.” Id.
250. Id.
251. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a).
252. See id. §§ 507(a)(4), 507(a)(7).
253. See id. § 507(a)(1).
254. Priority unsecured claims must be paid in full before ordinary unsecured claims receive anything. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 75
(defining “priority claim” as an “unsecured claim that is entitled to be paid
ahead of other unsecured claims that are not entitled to priority status” and
explaining that “[p]priority refers to the order in which these unsecured claims
are to be paid”). Further, “priority” refers to:
The Bankruptcy Code’s statutory ranking of unsecured claims that
determines the order in which unsecured claims will be paid if there
is not enough money to pay all unsecured claims in full. For example,
under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, money owed to the case
trustee or for prepetition alimony and/or child support must be paid
in full before any general unsecured debt (i.e. trade debt or credit card
debt) is paid.
Id.
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Chapter 9’s approval of an insolvent municipality’s negotiated plan to reorganize and adjust its debts provides guidance
to water-stakeholder groups. Chapter 9 gives significant weight
to the municipality’s suggested plan for reorganization, a focus
appropriate in the context of water administrators’ special ex255
pertise in water allocation. The bankruptcy court must confirm the municipality’s reorganization plan if it satisfies the
256
general requirements set out in the Code.
Among other
things, the plan must be “feasible” and “in the best interest of
257
creditors,” which generally means that the municipality has
made a “reasonable effort” to place its creditors in a better position than they would be if the bankruptcy case were dis258
259
missed. If creditors’ claims under the plan are “impaired,”
then the plan cannot be confirmed unless at least one class of
260
impaired claims accepts the plan. The plan for reorganization
may provide for the reduction, impairment, alteration, and/or
pro rata payment of creditors’ claims by repaying debts under a
261
specified “cents on the dollar” formula. Bankruptcy also allows for the subordination of senior rights to junior ones. This
occurs “in the interest of confirmation of a plan and rehabilita262
tion of the debtor.” In addition, municipalities may reject,
subject to court approval, executory contracts under which all
263
duties have not yet been performed.
B. BANKRUPTCY: THE WATER CONTEXT
Traditional bankruptcy principles offer invaluable guidance to water stakeholder groups. Just as the traditional process seeks to reorganize the financial operations of distressed
individuals, corporations, and municipalities to produce a
255. See supra note 230 and accompanying text; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129
(provisions concerning judicial confirmation of a plan for reorganization).
256. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 943(b), 1129.
257. Id. § 943(b)(7).
258. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 56.
259. “Impaired” claims, generally, are those whose legal, equitable, and
contractual rights have been altered by the bankruptcy plan. See generally 11
U.S.C. § 1124.
260. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). But see id. § 1129(b)(1) (articulating “cram
down” provision).
261. See id. § 1123(b)(1) (providing that a plan may “impair or leave unimpaired any class of claims, secured or unsecured, or of interests”) and § 1124,
both made applicable to Chapter 9 by 11 U.S.C. § 901.
262. S. REP. NO. 95-989, § 510, 95th Cong. (1978); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 510(a) (recognizing enforceability of subordination agreements).
263. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 53.
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healthier and more sustainable economic future, so also might
water bankruptcy reorganize the liquid assets of a region to
produce healthier and more sustainable watersheds. The following subsections highlight, respectively, the mechanics of water bankruptcy and three contexts for which it is best suited.
1. The Mechanics of Water Bankruptcy
Declaration of insolvency. To qualify for the protection of
bankruptcy, a municipality must be “insolvent,” or unable to
264
pay its debts as they become due. In its petition for relief, a
water bankrupt agency would likely demonstrate that a particular watershed or aquifer is over-appropriated to a degree that
265
both agency and stakeholders deem unacceptable. This could
occur when a significant number of water users, including
those holding senior priorities, agree that the current system is
266
on the verge of collapse. In some cases, state lawmakers may
effectively issue a declaration of insolvency and petition for relief through legislation calling for widespread water reform to
267
forestall the collapse of the entire system.
Articulation of goals. The goal of traditional bankruptcy is
to give the debtor a fresh start through a systematic and com268
prehensive reorganization of its debts. For meaningful discussions among water stakeholders, there must be widespread
frustration with the current allocation of water sufficient to
269
trigger a negotiated departure from priority allocation. That
is, the collaborators must agree that they are seeking a sustainable allocation of water through a non-traditional approach
and that they are willing to bargain away some benefits of priority in exchange for other perceived advantages, such as secu270
rity or sustainability. In some cases, state legislation might
articulate collaborative goals, rather than a winner-takes-all
271
approach to the resolution of competing claims. Lacking such
a consensus, the water users’ complaints could be resolved
264. See supra note 235–36 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part I.B.
266. See supra note 219.
267. The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009 provides an
example of such legislation. See infra Part III.C.2.
268. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 219.
270. See infra Part III.C.2.
271. For example, in 2009 California’s state regulatory agencies called for
widespread reform to achieve two legislatively-articulated “coequal goals.” See
infra Part III.C.2.
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more efficiently through traditional channels of judicial and
administration dispute resolution.
Listing of debts and creditors. To support its petition for relief, a traditional debtor must provide a list of its creditors and
272
its debts. Likewise, insolvent state water agencies would be
required to produce a detailed list of all valid water rights, including the volumes of appropriation, purposes of use, places of
use, and identity of the water users. In jurisdictions that do not
keep detailed records of water rights and beneficial use, this
requirement would be difficult to satisfy, and a negotiated list
of debts and creditors might be produced as a substitute for official state records.
Providing proof of claims. Would-be creditors must submit
specific proofs of claim in the context of traditional bankruptcy
273
if their claims are “disputed, contingent, or unliquidated.”
Similarly, creditors in water bankruptcy would be required to
demonstrate the extent to which they had actually put their
274
water rights to beneficial, non-wasteful, consumptive use.
The difference between the face value of water rights and the
volume of historic consumptive use would be subject potentially
275
to abandonment. In addition, such proofs would be required
of those holding “conditional” water rights, as the counterpart
276
to traditional contingent claims.
Distribution of assets. Traditional bankruptcy classifies
277
valid interests as “secured” or “unsecured.” The former will
be satisfied in order of temporal priority by the liquidation of a
278
specific asset (such as a home secured by a mortgage). Unsecured claims, in contrast, may receive pro rata distributions in
279
partial satisfaction of the debt. Unsecured claimants, therefore, will share the loss regardless of the year in which their
claims arose. In the context of water bankruptcy, the distinction between secured and unsecured claims provides rich
ground for stakeholder discussion and negotiation. Senior appropriators would likely argue that their water rights consti-

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
See GETCHES, NUTSHELL supra note 24.
See id.
See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text.
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tute secured claims entitled to early satisfaction. Environmental interests might agree, and further claim that environmental uses should be recognized as senior claims that predate
281
all others. Junior appropriators, in contrast, might assert
that water rights are unsecured claims because they are
usufructuary in nature, and not attached to any particular
282
molecule of water for their satisfaction.
Further, juniors
might argue that water rights relying on future precipitation
(including most sources other than aquifers gradually filled
over the course of years, decades, or even centuries) constitute
a natural counterpart to unsecured financial claims that de283
pend on debtors’ future ability to pay. As a consequence, if
water rights constitute secured claims, then the distribution of
assets may follow a scheme that mirrors the prior appropriation doctrine; but if water rights are treated as unsecured
claims, then the pro rata distribution of assets might resemble
284
riparianism, rather than the priority doctrine.
The debtor’s plan for reorganization may elect to provide
special treatment for important social or pragmatic interests
285
labeled as “preferences.” In parallel fashion, water bankruptcy stakeholders must determine whether one type of human
use (agricultural irrigation or urban water supply, for example)
should be given preferential treatment over others. Similarly,
environmental stakeholders would likely make the case that
environmental debts such as the protection of minimum stream
flows should be considered as important to society as the pref286
erences protected in bankruptcy. In support of this claim, environmentalists might argue that base level stream flows are
essential to wet the riverbed and to facilitate physical deliver280. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
281. See Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529
P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo. 1974) (rejecting argument that water-loving trees
known as “phreatophytes” predated senior water rights in the Arkansas River
watershed).
282. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 66, 279–81 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 251–54 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. In some cases, western
water law already elevates the protection of stream flows above other interests. See, e.g., Michael F. Browning, Instream Flow Water Rights in the Western States and Provinces, 56 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9–1, 9–29 (2010) (describing the concept of “upside-down” water rights, which “quantify how much
water should be allowed to be diverted for development, and protect all remaining flows” for instream and environmental purposes).
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ies of water, without which the entire water system might col287
lapse. Thus, they would conclude that instream flows and
other environmental debts should be considered as important
to society as the priorities and preferences protected in bankruptcy.
2. The Context of Water Bankruptcy
There are at least three contexts in which water bankruptcy could provide invaluable guidance to water users facing
seemingly insurmountable problems. As an essential prerequisite, there must widespread acknowledgement that the current
system is unsustainable and, indeed, that the entire watershed
288
may be on the verge of collapse. Equally important, stakeholders must come willingly and voluntarily to negotiate a
work-around of the priority doctrine in the hope of achieving a
more certain, stable, and satisfactory allocation of limited wa289
ter resources.
Allocating groundwater. The priority doctrine has proved
290
unequal to the task of groundwater administration. Even the
stalwart appropriative jurisdiction of Colorado does not apply
the doctrine strictly to its groundwater resources: rather, Colorado modifies the prior appropriation doctrine “to permit the
full economic development” of so-called “designated” groundwa291
ter resources.
Additionally, in the case of “nontributary”
groundwater, Colorado departs from the priority doctrine entirely, instead allocating the resource on the basis of ownership
292
of the overlying land.
Today, in various aquifers, there is widespread agreement
that current practices are not sustainable. When surface water
supplies are inadequate in the seven-state Colorado River ba-

287. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 18.
289. See id.
290. See John D. Leshy, The Federal Role in Managing the Nation’s
Groundwater, 11 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2004) (“State
law generally has not been adequate to the task of managing the nation’s
groundwater” and it remains a subject about which “‘misinformation, misunderstanding, and mysticism’ abound, and the law that governs it is murky.”
(quoting NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 230
(1973))); see also Joseph L. Sax, We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 269, 271 (2003).
291. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102(1) (2011).
292. See id. § 37-90-102(2).
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293

sin,
for example, water users make up the difference by
pumping groundwater. Because groundwater supplies typically
are not fully replenished annually, such pumping is unsustainable. As concluded by a 2011 study, “In the U.S. Southwest . . .
there is less rain and snowfall each year than the amount of
water used in the region. Today that shortfall is made up for by
294
pumping groundwater, well beyond the sustainable rate.”
The reports concludes ominously, “[a]dd the impacts of growing
population and incomes, and the Southwest will face a major
295
water crisis in the coming decades.” Other major aquifers
face similar threats from unsustainable practices, including
296
portions of the Ogallala Aquifer beneath Kansas and Texas,
297
Nebraska groundwater, and the aquifer underlying the Cen298
tral Valley of California.
Allocating interstate rivers. The Colorado River Basin provides the paradigmatic example of a watershed amenable to
principles of water bankruptcy. In 1922, the seven states of the
Colorado River basin entered into the Colorado River Com293. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
294. ANDREW FREEDMAN, Report Warns of Worsening Western Water Crisis, CLIMATE CENTRAL (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.climatecentral.org/blogs/
report-warns-of-worsening-western-water-crisis/ (quoting FRANK ACKERMAN &
ELIZABETH A. STANTON, STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST., THE LAST DROP: CLIMATE
CHANGE AND THE SOUTHWEST WATER CRISIS 4 (2011), available at http://seiinternational.org/publications?pid=1843.
295. Id.
296. See Groundwater Depletion in Semiarid Regions of Texas and California Threatens U.S. Food Security, UNIV. OF TEXAS (May 29, 2012),
http://www.utexas.edu/news/2012/05/29/groundwater/ (describing results of
study published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences which, inter alia, predicts that current rates of agricultural irrigation in portions of the
High Plains are unsustainable for more than another few decades); see also
Pete Spotts, Southern Great Plains Could Run Out of Groundwater in 30
Years, Study Finds, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 30, 2012, available
at
http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2012/0530/Southern-Great
-Plains-could-run-out-of-groundwater-in-30-years-study-finds.
297. See J. David Aiken, The Western Common Law of Tributary Groundwater: Implications for Nebraska, 84 NEB. L. REV. 541, 542 (2004) (“Nebraska
water law is on a collision course with reality. For decades Nebraska judges
and water policy makers have ignored the hydrologic connection between surface water and tributary groundwater, the groundwater that provides the
stream’s base flow.”).
298. See Spotts, supra note 296. The problem is not confined to western
aquifers. See generally Patrik Jonsson, Drought: Farmers Dig Deeper, Water
Tables Drop, Competition Heats Up: A Drier “New Normal” Is Forcing U.S.
Farmers to Dig Deeper Wells, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 8, 2012 (describing aquifer declines up to forty feet in Georgia due, in significant part, to
increased agricultural irrigation).
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299

pact, an agreement intended to allocate the great river in a
way that would satisfy the present and projected needs of both
the Upper Division states (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and
300
Wyoming) and the Lower Division states (Arizona, California,
301
and Nevada). The Upper Division states joined the negotiation out of fear that the western doctrine of prior appropriation—the basis of water allocation within each state’s borders—
302
would be applied also to the interstate allocation of the river.
Because the upper states were slower to develop than their
downstream sisters, application of the priority doctrine would
assign less-reliable, junior water rights to the upstream
303
states. The downstream states, for their part, sought the political cooperation of their upstream neighbors in lobbying Congress for the federal funding necessary to construct dams and
reservoirs on the lower Colorado River, infrastructure that
304
would provide a direct benefit to California irrigators. Thus,
all states entered into negotiations voluntarily, because they
worried that the status quo would not be sustainable in light of
their interests. As the upper states hoped, the resulting agreement rejected the interstate application of the priority doctrine.
Instead, the parties allocated the river’s flow roughly equally
299. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
COLORADO RIVER COMPACT (1922), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
g1000/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf.
300. See id. at Article II(c). In 1948, the Upper Basin states further allocated their share of the river among themselves. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN COMPACT (1948),
available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf.
301. See COLORADO RIVER COMPACT, supra note 299, at Article II(d). In
1928, legislation authorizing the Boulder Canyon Project effectively allocated
the Colorado River among the Lower Basin states. See Arizona v. California,
283 U.S. 423, 448–49 (1931) (beginning a line of numerous related Supreme
Court cases with the same name). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA U.S. SUPREME COURT
DECISION OF 1964, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/lawofrvr.html (documenting current seniors with private claims and each state’s allocation of water beginning 1964) (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
302. See James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s
Claims to Water from the Colorado River Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 290, 297–99 (2001) (arguing that the Upper Basin states
feared that Supreme Court precedent would allow the Lower Basin states to
“obtain permanent preferential rights to water simply by developing faster”
and that they entered into a compact to “eliminate the application of the prior
appropriation doctrine on an interstate basis”).
303. See id. at 297; see, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 502 (1922)
(applying the doctrine of prior appropriation to allocate the use of an interstate river among two states that applied the doctrine on an intrastate basis).
304. See Lochhead, supra note 302, at 293–94.
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305

among upstream and downstream states. In particular, the
upper states pledged to deliver a rolling average of 7.5 million
acre-feet (maf) of water each year to their downstream sister
306
states.
This arrangement might have worked well enough, but for
an error of storied proportions: the negotiators assumed that
river flows of their era (about 16.4 maf, which provided a comfortable margin beyond the Upper Division’s entitlement to 7.5
maf and the Lower Division’s entitlement to another 7.5 maf)
were representative and would continue into the indefinite fu307
308
ture. Unfortunately, this assumption was not accurate, and
the Compact stems from an overly-optimistic, inflated estimate
of actual river flows, which plagued the states for almost a century. In 2007, when drought threatened the sustainability of
the seven states’ water supply from the Colorado, they again
309
turned to negotiation rather than the priority doctrine. The
result was an agreement executed by the Secretary of the Interior and the seven states that set forth a twenty-year plan for
310
conserving, sharing, and cooperating during drought. According to one water manager, the seven states have perfected a cooperative ethic of interstate sharing that supplants the doctrine

305. See COLORADO RIVER COMPACT, supra note 299, at Article III(a) (apportioning in perpetuity the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 7.5 million
acre-feet of water per annum to the Upper Basin and of 7.5 million acre-feet of
water per annum to the Lower Basin, with certain specified adjustments).
306. See id. at Article III(d). In 1944, the United States pledged to allocate
1.5 million acre-feet annually to Mexico. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, UTILIZATION OF WATERS OF THE COLORADO AND
TIJUANA RIVERS AND OF THE RIO GRANDE, TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND MEXICO, Article 10(a) (1944), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/mextrety.pdf.
307. See COLORADO RIVER COMPACT, supra note 299, at Article III(a).
308. See Robert W. Adler, Revisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time for
a Change?, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19, 30 (2008) (explaining that
the basin states negotiated the compact based on the 1899–1920 hydrologic
record when annual Colorado River flows averaged 16.5 million acre feet, a
period much wetter than the rest of the twentieth century, during which average annual river flows declined to 15 maf (1896–2004) and to 14 maf (1922–
1982)).
309. See generally DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
RECORD OF DECISION: COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND
LAKE MEAD 1 (Dec. 13, 2007) available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf.
310. See id. at 3.
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311

of priority practiced within their borders —an approach that
is consistent with the principles of water bankruptcy.
More recently, the impacts of climate change and drought
led some to conclude, once again, that the current approach in
312
the Colorado basin was not sustainable. In response, some
313
have called for renegotiation of the Colorado River Compact,
314
while others have disagreed. Notably absent, however, are
calls for the application of the priority doctrine on an interstate
315
basis.
311. See Patricia Mulroy, Collaboration and the Colorado River Compact, 8
NEV. L.J. 890, 894 (2008). Mulroy asserts:
The seven states of the Colorado River Basin have spent much of the
past century working through some of the most complex, contentious
water resource issues imaginable. . . . Yet their collective experience
demonstrates the profound value of working together to resolve seemingly intractable problems, rather than resorting to litigation or the
kind of protracted conflict or competition that results in winners, losers, or nothing at all. By embracing the need for cooperation and
partnership implicit in the Compact, balancing our competing needs
and demands, and reaching out to share our experiences and solutions with others who are facing similar challenges, the seven basin
states are setting new standards for resource management that will
see our communities—and the Colorado River—through events such
as the drought and climate change well into the future.
Id. at 894.
312. Tim P. Barnett & David W. Pierce, When Will Lake Mead Go Dry?, 44
WATER RES. RESEARCH 1, 1 (2008), available at http://www.agu.org/pubs/
crossref/2008/2007WR006704.shtml (citing forecasts that runoff to the Colorado basin may decline ten to thirty percent over the next thirty to fifty years,
potentially affecting the water supply of 12 to 36 million people, and concluding that “[w]hen expected changes due to global warming are included as well,
currently scheduled depletions are simply not sustainable”).
313. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 308, at 22 (arguing that “significant changes in circumstances, new information, and problems and omissions in the original agreement suggest that it is time to reconsider some key provisions of the
compact,” in part because “[w]e understand more about the environmental impacts of dams and water diversions [and] the public generally places a higher
value on environmental protection . . . .”); Elana Schor, McCain Comments on
Colorado River Compact Makes Waves in Western States, GUARDIAN, Aug. 20,
2008,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/20/
johnmccain.water (quoting comments of then-Republican presidential candidate John McCain suggesting that the Compact should be re-negotiated).
314. See, e.g., Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado River Compact Entitlements,
Clearing Up Misconceptions, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 83, 104
(2008) (“Recent experience in developing interim shortage criteria and participating in the [endangered species] recovery plan is showing that the Colorado
River Compact is not in need of any amendment.”).
315. One prominent report concluded, “[t]he states have entered into 26
interstate water allocation compacts, primarily in the western United States,
most of them over 50 years ago. As interstate water conflicts have increased,
so has the realization that most of the existing compacts appear to be inade-
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Allocating intrastate rivers and aquifers. The next subsection considers yet another context in which water bankruptcy
might prove beneficial: intrastate negotiations among agricultural, urban, environmental, and other interests in light of the
requirements of the federal Endangered Species Act.
C. CASE STUDY: A PERFECT STORM IN CALIFORNIA

316

The California Bay-Delta provides an example of a water317
shed that is widely perceived to be on the verge of collapse. In
fact, in 2009, the state legislature proclaimed, “[t]he Legislature finds and declares . . . [t]he Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
watershed and California’s water infrastructure are in crisis
318
and existing Delta policies are not sustainable.” In response,
the legislature created a new state agency and charged it with
presiding over a collaborative effort to increase reliability of
319
water supplies and to enhance the ecosystem.
quate to resolve these conflicts.” Jerome C. Muys et al., Utton Transboundary
Resources Center Model Interstate Water Compact, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 17,
21 (2007). In response, the report suggests a model compact that the states
could adopt. Id.
316. This section was inspired, in part, by the author’s participation as a
member of National Research Council’s Committee on Sustainable Water and
Environmental Management in the California Bay-Delta, and as a member of
the Panel to Review California’s Draft Bay-Delta Conservation Plan. See generally COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE WATER AND ENVTL. MGMT. IN THE CAL. BAYDELTA, SUSTAINABLE WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE
CALIFORNIA BAY-DELTA (2012), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?
record_id=13394 (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE WATER
AND ENVTL. MGMT. IN THE CAL. BAY-DELTA, A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES FOR REDUCING WATER MANAGEMENT EFFECTS ON THREATENED
AND ENDANGERED FISHES IN CAL.’S BAY DELTA (2010), available at http://www
.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12881 (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); PANEL TO
REVIEW CALIFORNIA’S DRAFT BAY-DELTA CONSERVATION PLAN, A REVIEW OF
THE USE OF SCIENCE AND ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA’S DRAFT
BAY-DELTA CONSERVATION PLAN (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=13148 (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
317. See, e.g., BEAU GOLDIE, SANTA CLARA VALLEY WATER DISTRICT ET AL.,
Restoring the Delta, Protecting Our Future, http://www.valleywater.org/
EkContent.aspx?id=8272 (click on attachment “Restoring the Delta–Protecting
our Future”) (quoting a statement from the Public Policy Institute of California that “California’s current water system raises several red flags. Catastrophic interruptions of water supplies from earthquakes and floods could
cause large short-term losses; unreliable supplies could also jeopardize business and infrastructure investments that support economic growth”) (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
318. Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009, CAL. WATER CODE
§ 85001(a) (West 2009), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/
calawquery?codesection=wat.
319. See infra notes 347–48 and accompanying text.
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1. Water Rights in California
California practices a blend of riparian water law (the
common law in the East) and western prior appropriation, with
both systems subject to the constitutional requirement of rea320
sonable and beneficial use. Riparian rights must be satisfied
321
first. Then administrators allocate the remaining supply, if
322
any, among appropriators in order of temporal priority. In
some cases, the State Water Board may modify existing appropriative water rights under a centuries-old policy known as the
323
public trust doctrine.
Two governmental appropriators are particularly significant: the federal Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) and the California Department of Water Resources (DWR). The Bureau operates the Central Valley Project (CVP), a massive system of
324
water storage and delivery authorized in 1935. The CVP is a
multi-purpose project, with a significant portion of its water go325
ing to agricultural users. California operates the State Water
326
Project (SWP), which began operation in the 1960s. Like its
320. See CAL. CONST., art. 10, § 2 (West 2012).
321. See Tulare Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 976 (Cal.
1935). But see In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656,
676 (Cal. 1979) (upholding restrictions on the exercise of dormant riparian
rights).
322. See Tulare Dist., 45 P.2d at 976.
323. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d
709, 712 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (recognizing state’s continuing jurisdiction over flowing waters, tidelands, and lakeshores for the purpose of protecting the public’s interest in fishing, navigation, commerce, and
resource preservation); State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d
189.272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see also supra Part II.A.4.
324. See The Central Valley Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvp/index.html (last modified Sept.
28, 2010). See generally Reed D. Benson, New Adventures of the Old Bureau:
Modern-Day Reclamation Statutes and Congress’s Unfinished Environmental
Business, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 137, 152 (2011) (discussing the history of the
Bureau of Reclamation and introducing some background on the CVP); Lloyd
G. Carter, Reaping Riches in a Wretched Region: Subsidized Industrial Farming and its Link to Perpetual Poverty, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 6
(2009) (explaining that the CVP is the largest publicly funded water management system in the United States); Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91, at
776–80 (giving some background on water law in the west, prior appropriation, and the public trust doctrine).
325. See Central Valley Project: General Description, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?
proj_Name=Central+Valley+Project (last modified Apr. 21, 2011).
326. See California State Water Project Water Contractors, CAL. DEPARTMENT WATER RESSOURCES, http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/contractor_intro.cfm
(last modified Apr. 29, 2008).
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327

sister project, the SWP is multi-purpose and supplies both
328
municipal and agricultural users. The Bureau and the State
hold water rights for the operation of these projects, which they
have contractually committed to deliver to numerous water329
user groups. The water rights held by the Bureau and the
State for the operation of these projects are relatively junior by
330
California standards. As a result, they—and the contract deliveries dependent on such water rights—are vulnerable to cur331
tailment in times of shortage.
2. Stakeholder Negotiations in the California Bay-Delta
The California Bay-Delta is one of the nation’s most critical
aquatic regions, and includes the largest estuary along the west
332
coast of North and South America. The confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers (the Delta) lies less than fifty
miles northeast of San Francisco. To the west and southwest of
the confluence, the rivers’ freshwater gives way to the saline
waters of San Francisco Bay. The San-Joaquin River Delta and
San Francisco Bay (together, the Bay-Delta) represent the
“hub” of the water-delivery system for the entire state of California that provides drinking water for more than twenty mil333
lion citizens, irrigation water that supports a $28 billion agricultural industry in central California, and a commercial and

327. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra
note 325 (explaining federal/state coordination of the CVP and SWP facilities).
328. See CAL. DEPARTMENT WATER RESOURCES, supra note 326 (explaining
that SWP water goes to 24 municipal contractors and to 5 agricultural users).
329. See generally Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res.,
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing long term contracts
between the California Department of Water Resources and several local water contractors).
330. See California State Water Project Water Rights, CAL. DEPARTMENT
WATER RESOURCES, http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/waterrights.cfm (last modified Apr. 29, 2008) (specifying that the appropriations date back to 1927).
331. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing curtailment of junior priorities) and
supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (discussing full- and overappropriation of California’s water supply).
332. ISENBERG, supra note 5, at 2 (describing Bay-Delta as “one of the most
significant ecosystems in the world”); Welcome to the Delta, CALFED BAYDELTA PROGRAM ARCHIVED WEBSITE, http://calwater.ca.gov/delta/index.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (describing the Delta as “the largest estuary on the
western coast of the Americas”).
333. JAMES NICKLES ET AL., CALIFORNIA’S BAY-DELTA: USGS SCIENCE
SUPPORTS DECISION MAKING, FACT SHEET 2010-3032 (2010), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3032.
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recreational fishing industry valued at hundreds of millions of
334
dollars.
But the system is in crisis. As California acknowledges, the
Delta provides “a lush habitat for plants and animals, many of
which are found only in the Delta. Unfortunately, many of the
335
Delta species have been declared threatened or endangered.”
Large portions of the region’s historical wetland habitats have
336
been destroyed. Federal agencies involved in the Delta paint
a bleak picture. In 2009, they composed a list of the Delta’s
problems:
Decades of environmental degradation have led to severe declines in
Delta fisheries and have contributed to the collapse of the State of
California’s . . . salmon fishing industry. The State is in the third year
of drought with the consequent decreased water supplies contributing
further to the problems. Both the Bay-Delta ecosystem and the economy dependent on its water and fish are on the precipice of collapse.
Furthermore, climate change and seismic risks present additional, serious threats to the Bay-Delta environment, the levees and the Delta
communities that depend on them, as well as the water supplies that
337
travel through the Bay-Delta.

For decades, California has searched for a solution to the
Bay-Delta’s woes, and a method to resolve the seemingly intractable conflict among agricultural, environmental, fishery,
338
urban, and other water users, and between state and federal
339
regulatory authorities. In late 1994, state and federal repre340
sentatives signed the Bay-Delta Accord, giving rise to a collaborative process known as “CALFED” (the name of which
334. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., CALIFORNIA BAY-DELTA MEMOUNDERSTANDING AMONG FEDERAL AGENCIES § I(a) (Sept. 29,
2009), available at http://www.doi.gov/documents/BayDeltaMOUSigned.pdf.
335. Delta Species of Concern, CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM ARCHIVED
WEBSITE, http://www.calwater.ca.gov/delta/species/index.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2012). In 1993, the federal Fish and Wildlife Service listed the Delta
smelt as a “threatened species” under the Endangered Species Act, and the
National Marine Fisheries Service listed the winter-run Chinook salmon as a
threatened species.
336. See ISENBERG, supra note 5, at 4.
337. CALIFORNIA BAY-DELTA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG
FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 334 (emphasis added).
338. See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 342–45 (1996) (discussing the debate over
sustainability and water quality standards in the Bay-Delta).
339. See id. at 345–48.
340. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR AGREEMENT ON
BAY-DELTA STANDARDS BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1 (Dec. 15, 1994), available at http://www.calwater.ca.gov/
content/Documents/library/SFBayDeltaAgreement.pdf.
RANDUM OF
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suggests the collaboration between California and federal agencies). The California legislature described CALFED as “the
largest, most comprehensive water management program in
341
the world.” Soon after validating CALFED, the legislature
called on its participants “to develop a long-term solution to
water management, environmental, and other problems in the
bay-delta watershed by means of a programmatic environmen342
tal impact statement . . . .”
Despite its optimistic scope,
343
CALFED began to fall apart by about 2005. Sifting through
the ruins, one scholar suggested that CALFED’s downfall was
its attempt to do the near-impossible: “manag[e] a dynamic,
oversubscribed resource to provide increased consumption, in344
creased protection, and increased reliability . . . .”
In sum,
CALFED tried to be all things to everyone, as suggested by its
345
slogan, “everyone will get better together.”
CALFED was superseded by yet another collaborative process, even more optimistic and sweeping than its predecessor.
In 2009, the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act mandated that water officials come up with a plan to achieve the
“coequal goals” of simultaneously providing a more reliable water supply for water users, while also protecting, restoring, and
enhancing the critical ecosystem from which those supplies will
346
be drawn, the Bay-Delta. In addition, the legislature called
341. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD. ET AL., CALFED
GRAMMATIC RECORD OF DECISION 1 (Aug. 28, 2000) available

BAY-DELTA PROat http://calwater

.ca.gov/content/documents/ROD.pdf.
342. CAL. WATER CODE § 79190 (West 2009). See generally Jody Freeman
& Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795
(2005) (discussing the “modular” concept of environmental regulation and using CALFED as a case study); Dave Owen, Law, Environmental Dynamism,
Reliability: The Rise and Fall of CALFED, 37 ENVTL. L. 1145, 1157–65, 1208–
14 (2007) (explaining traditional frameworks in regulating scarce resources
and suggesting a new one); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 307–09 (2000) (suggesting CALFED
as a constrained version of an environmental brokerage approach of regulation).
343. See Owen, supra note 342, at 1150.
344. See id. at 1199–1200 (arguing that CALFED’s fatal flaw was its assumption that water not legally committed to protection of the environment
must be delivered to water users).
345. Sue McClurg, Delta Deal?, WESTERN WATER MAG., Jul./Aug. 2000,
available at http://www.watereducation.org/doc.asp?id=927.
346. The California Delta is the region where the Sacramento and San
Joaquin Rivers meet. As explained by the Delta Stewardship Council, the
agency charged by statute with overseeing the achievement of the co-equal
goals, “Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is a regional, state and national treasure that supplies the drinking water of about 25 million Californians.” It is
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for satisfaction of the coequal goals “in a manner that protects
and enhances the unique cultural, recreational, natural re347
source, and agricultural values” of the Delta. The legislature
placed those duties on the shoulders of a newly created inde348
pendent state agency—the Delta Stewardship Council. The
chair of the Stewardship Council recognized that many viewed
the new legislation as California’s “most significant water poli349
cy step in almost 50 years.” But without a coherent framework to support the reallocation of water, rather than mere
feel-good language calling for the satisfaction of wide-ranging
goals, the Delta Stewardship Council lacked an important safeguard against the problems that eventually led to its predecessor’s demise.
3. Litigation in California
At least two bodies of federal law have played an important
role in the allocation of water rights in California. First, under
section 7 of the ESA, federal agencies must “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency” is not
likely to jeopardize endangered species or adversely modify
350
their critical habitat. Pursuant to its responsibilities under
the ESA, federal wildlife agencies issued “biological opinions,”
concluding that certain “reasonable and prudent alternatives”
to the proposed operation of the CVP and SWP would be necessary to protect endangered fish species in central California, including restrictions on the timing and volume of water diver351
sions. The restrictions set off a torrent of criticism by water
users and prompted a spate of lawsuits beginning in the 1990s
352
challenging the biological opinions under the ESA.
also the home to more than 515,000 people and “the hub of state, federal and
local water systems that provide at least a portion of the water supply needs
for two-thirds of all Californians.” The Delta, DELTA STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www.deltacouncil.ca.gov/delta (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); see supra Part
III.C.
347. CAL. WATER CODE § 85054 (West 2009).
348. See id. § 85200(a).
349. ISENBERG, supra note 5, at 1.
350. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1973).
351. Benson, supra note 204, at 558–59.
352. See generally Reed D. Benson, Environmental Review of Western Water Project Operations: Where NEPA Has Not Applied, Will It Now Protect
Farmers from Fish?, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 269 (2011); Brian E. Gray,
Dividing the Waters: The California Experience, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1297 (2008); Shelley Ross Saxer, Managing Water Rights
Using Fishing Rights as a Model, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 91 (2011); J.B. Ruhl &
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In addition, the restrictions spawned litigation in which irrigators deprived of some of their water deliveries under contracts with the federal Bureau of Reclamation and the State
Department of Water Resources claimed that the restrictions
constituted a regulatory taking of their water rights for which
353
compensation was owed.
The irrigators prevailed in their
2001 lawsuit, representing the first time that a court held that
actions required under the ESA could constitute a regulatory
354
taking of water rights.
D. THE BENEFITS OF WATER BANKRUPTCY
California’s series of collaborative processes provides a case
study for the concept of water bankruptcy. This section suggests three concrete, practical benefits that water-bankruptcy
principles could produce in the context of California’s BayDelta. Overall, the bankruptcy model provides a roadmap to direct the discussion of stakeholder groups. As such, it may facilitate the consideration of tough questions in dire circumstances.
1. Establishing Realistic Expectations
Declaring water insolvency in the Bay-Delta would perform
an important signaling function that would address one of the
primary challenges faced in bankrupt watersheds: admitting
that the current system is broken and demonstrating willing355
ness to compromise in light of such collapse. When asked to
review the sustainability of water and environmental management practices in the Bay-Delta, the National Research Council
of the National Academies of Science cited as a primary roadblock the state’s failure to acknowledge scarcity:
Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV.
424 (2010); Paul Stanton Kibel, The Public Trust Navigates California’s Bay
Delta, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (2011); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Uncertainty
and Markets in Water Resources, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 117, 124 –25 (2005).
353. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed.
Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl. 2001). See generally Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish,
Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279
(2003) (describing “clash of cultures” among farmers, environmentalists, Native Americans, and federal agencies in the Klamath region of northern California and southern Oregon).
354. See Benson, supra note 204; see also Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reductions in Reclamation Water Contract Deliveries: A Fifth Amendment Taking of
Property?, 36 ENVTL. L. 1331, 1363–64 (2006); Brian E. Gray, The Property
Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 –9 (2002).
355. See supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text (discussing three primary challenges of water bankruptcy proceedings).
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While some Californians have increasingly recognized the scarcity of
water, not everyone has. The failure of plans for water management
in the Delta to acknowledge scarcity has greatly hindered the ability
of agencies to craft and implement water plans and policies that will
be widely accepted. The management of Delta water by court decisions reflects in part the lack of adequate water resource planning
356
that takes scarcity into account.

The declaration of insolvency would also help to set a tone
of compromise. Despite the legislature’s rosy articulation of two
357
co-equal goals, the context of bankruptcy should dampen water users’ expectations that everyone can emerge from the process with more water. And yet, that was precisely the case during the Bay-Delta negotiations. As the National Research
Council (NRC) explained, the legislative treatment of water security and environmental enhancement as equal had the potential benefit of “forc[ing] planners to consider tradeoffs between
water supply and environmental protection” and the educational advantage of “becom[ing] part of the public discourse
358
about water.” But those advantages were not realized. Instead, in the words of the NRC, it appeared “to be assumed that
additional water will have to be found to serve the co-equal
359
goals.” This created an impossible situation, the report continued, in which, “[i]f the attainment of either or both goals requires more water than is currently available, and additional
water is unavailable because of scarcity, then the co-equal goals
360
cannot be attained.”
2. Rejecting Willful Ignorance
However diligently California legislators and officials seek
to address the deteriorating conditions of the Bay-Delta, their
356. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 32–33.
357. See ISENBERG, supra note 5.
358. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 34 –35.
359. Id. at 36. The same unrealistic expectations plagued the earlier
CALFED process. See Owen, supra note 343, at 1154 –55 (describing CALFED
managers’ belief that their job was to attempt to provide more water for consumption).
360. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 35. As a coalition of environmental, fishing, tribal, and environmental justice interests complained, the
state’s approach was little more than “smoke and mirrors.” See Dan Bacher,
Huge Coalition Presents Historic Recommendations to Delta Council, CENTRAL
VALLEY (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2011/10/03/
18692002.php (“The Council simply can’t bring itself to define the ‘co-equal
goals’ or acknowledge that, in an overappropriated watershed where protection of public trust resources requires more water, someone will have to make
do with less water.” (quoting Bill Jennings, Executive Director, California
Sportfishing Protection Alliance)).
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efforts are vulnerable to misinterpretation—whether innocent
361
or willful. In contrast to the optimism of the co-equal goals,
the Bureau of Reclamation reports that there is an increasing
362
gap in California between supply and demand. As of 2008,
the Bureau documented statewide water demands ranging
363
from 57.2 to 60.6 million acre-feet per year. At the same time,
the Bureau measured statewide supply-demand gaps at somewhere between 2.3 and 4.3 million acre-feet annually, which
represents “unmet urban, agricultural, and environmental demands, along with the annual estimated amount of ground wa364
ter overdraft [as compared to] currently available supplies.”
By the year 2030, the Bureau projected that the supply-demand
gap would increase to an estimated 4.9 million acre-feet per
year (in average years) and 6.1 million acre-feet per year (in
365
dry years). In some regions, the gap would greatly exceed
366
statewide estimates.
Beyond the unrealistic expectations spawned by the coequal goals, California has chosen willful water ignorance in
several additional contexts. First, the state does not keep pre367
cise records of water use and water rights. As Phil Isenberg,
chair of the Delta Stewardship Council, asked rhetorically:
How can California’s water delivery system be made “more reliable” if
we do not keep track of the full amount of existing water rights, and
have no idea of the amount of water that might be required under
[laws relating to the transfer of water from one watershed to another]? If there are individuals and areas with a legal entitlement to a
vast unknown and unknowable amount of water, . . . how can any wa361. See generally Ellen Hanak et al., Myths of California Water: Implications and Reality, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 3 (2010) (discussing common public misconceptions regarding California’s water system).
362. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, MID-PACIFIC REGION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, WATER SUPPLY AND YIELD STUDY 2–14 (2008) (discussing supplydemand gaps), available at http://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvp/docs/Water%20Supply%
20and%20Yield%20Study.pdf.

363. Id. at iv (representing the range demanded in a dry year and an average year).
364. Id. at iv–vi (representing the year 2000 gap, ranging from an average
year to a dry year).
365. Id. at vi (as compared to a future statewide demand in 2030 estimated
between 60.8 maf in average years and 57.4 maf in dry years).
366. Id.; see also ISENBERG, supra note 5, at 2 (“Our statewide water supply is under stress and that stress will continue. Our available water supply is
increasingly volatile. . . . Climate change appears to be the main reason . . . .”);
id. at 3 (“Our total water supply is relatively finite and has changed little in
the last 30 years, while demand continues to grow. . . . We annually use more
water than nature provides.”).
367. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 134, at 64.
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ter system be truly reliable? . . . And to compound the problem, why
do we refuse to keep careful track of who uses how much water, and
368
for what?

In addition to imprecise recordkeeping, California has no
comprehensive permit system for the regulation of groundwater, even though groundwater accounts for about one-third of
369
the state’s water usage.
Overlying landowners can freely
withdraw the percolating groundwater (that is, groundwater
that does not flow as an underground stream) beneath their
370
property for reasonable and beneficial use. This right is subject only to the “correlative” right of other overlying landowners
371
withdrawing from the same source. As one California court
complained in 2006, “California is the only western state that
still treats surface water and groundwater under separate and
372
distinct legal regimes.” Rather than acknowledge the connection between surface and subsurface supplies, the court explained, California depends on water classifications “that bear
373
little or no relationship to hydrological realities.”
374
Applying the mechanics of water bankruptcy listed above
would provide a catalyst for water agencies to develop a practice of collecting and reporting critical water data about water
use and water rights in their jurisdiction. After declaring insolvency and convening a stakeholder group to discuss the realistic goals watershed reorganization, debtor municipalities would
be required to make a careful accounting of their debts and
creditors before seeking the protection of bankruptcy—that is,
they would list the water rights permitted in the relevant region, including details on the approved volumes, types, and
375
places of use. Likewise, water users would be prompted to
368. Isenbereg, supra note 4, at 8; see also Kevin M. O’Brien, Alice in
Groundwater Land: Water Supply Assessments and Subsurface Water Supplies, 4 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 131, 132 (2010) (“California’s long tradition of decentralized management—its ‘patchwork quilt’ of measurement,
management and water rights administration . . . has been at odds with the
Legislature’s efforts to inject precision and certainty into water supply and
land use planning processes.”).
369. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 41.
370. See id. at 21.
371. See id.
372. North Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 43 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 821, 831 (Cal. App. 2006).
373. Id. See also CAL. WATER CODE § 10920 (West 2009) (calling for
groundwater reform, but requiring only the monitoring and reporting of
groundwater elevations).
374. See supra Part III.B.1.
375. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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376

provide detailed “proofs of claim” to substantiate their actual
historic consumptive use. In cases where the demonstrated use
fell short of the face value of water rights, the difference would
be subject to abandonment under traditional principles of wa377
ter law. Further, bankruptcy law contains explicit penalties
for those who withhold information, which would provide an
antidote for water users’ temptation to overstate the volumes of
378
their water rights.
3. Accommodating Modern Values
After debts and claims have been substantiated, the insolvent water agency must come up with a plan for the distribu379
tion of assets that is acceptable to the creditors. This provides
a critical opportunity and challenge for the parties to agree how
much water should be dedicated to modern values such as environmental preservation, aesthetic enjoyment, and recreation.
As the Chairman of the Delta Stewardship Council explained,
“Our water supply and the ways we use water, and the ecosystem we protect or damage are deeply interconnected. . . . And,
as we have learned over the past 50 years, our desire to have a
modern, developed society rests on how it prizes and protects
380
its natural environment and a reliable supply of water.”
Many recognize that ecosystem collapse can lead to watersupply collapse. But, because society came to appreciate environmental values long after the most senior water rights had
been appropriated for domestic, irrigation, and other traditional uses, environmental water rights (such as instream flows or
minimum stream flows) receive only limited protection under
381
principles of water law.
376. See supra notes 272–75 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text.
378. See FED. R. OF BANKR. P. 3001(c)(2)(D) (if a claimant fails to provide
required information, a court may “preclude the holder from presenting the
omitted information” and/or “award other appropriate relief, including reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees caused by the failure”); see also supra note
173 and accompanying text (discussing the perverse incentive to overstate water rights created by the abandonment doctrine).
379. See supra notes 278–86 and accompanying text.
380. See ISENBERG, supra note 5, at 2.
381. See generally Browning, supra note 286, at 9–10 (discussing instream
flow water rights). Although environmental water rights tend to hold junior
priorities, some states have developed mechanisms to provide them with more
security. See id. at 9–12 (discussing Colorado’s instream flow program, which
authorizes specified entities to acquire existing senior water rights by purchase, donation, or other means, to change the use of the senior rights to
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The bankruptcy model forces municipalities to confront
such difficult issues directly as they develop and negotiate
382
plans to reorganize their debts. Among other things, stakeholders must agree whether environmental “debts” should be
treated as secured or unsecured, senior or junior, and whether
383
or not they rise to the level of preference.
CONCLUSION
Take one world already being exhausted by 6 billion people. Find the
ingredients to feed another 2 billion people. Add demand for more
food, more animal feed and more fuel. Use only the same amount of
water the planet has had since creation. And don’t forget to restore
384
the environment that sustains us. Stir very carefully.

The prior appropriation doctrine juxtaposes two of the
law’s most cherished values—stability and evolution in light of
changed circumstances. Increasingly, these values clash as watersheds become overappropriated. By definition, in watersheds
that suffer from overappropriation, some users at the end of the
line will face dashed hopes, defeated expectations, and no water. Such disappointment may prompt users to cling ever more
tightly to their “rights,” relying on their paper water permits as
proof of their actual entitlements. Understandably, they will
jealously guard their allotments against new water demands,
such as those posed by the protection of endangered species and
environmental preservation. At the same time, administrators
will face pressure to make hard decisions and to strictly construe existing rights in accordance with the principles of beneficial use and non-waste.
Eventually, the impasse among water users, administrators, and federal wildlife agencies may become so great that it
brings all interested parties to the bargaining table. Historically, such efforts at compromise have been hampered by the allor-nothing, first-come-first-served, inflexible culture spawned
by the appropriation doctrine. Increasingly, bowing to reality,
users may bargain for more security, but less water. But under
the current ad-hoc bargaining framework, they likely leave the
table with the bitter feeling that they have been cheated of
instream flow purposes, and to retain the acquired rights’ original senior priority dates).
382. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 246–54 and accompanying text.
384. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 7 (quoting Margaret CatleyCarlson, Patron Global Water Partnership, 2008–2009 Chair of World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Water Security).
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their rights, and that priority’s principles have given way to
something resembling riparianism’s contrary ethic of sharing.
This Article introduces the new concept of water bankruptcy to help water agencies confront the realities of overallocation
in the context of voluntary, stakeholder negotiations. By drawing an analogy to time-honored principles honed in desperate
circumstances, this Article hopes to show that negotiation and
sharing are well-recognized responses to shortage—whether it
goes under the name of insolvency or overappropriation. Further, this Article highlights many principles of bankruptcy that
will be surprisingly familiar to western water users. Hopefully,
such bankruptcy-derived principles can provide guidance and
comfort to numerous water-stakeholder groups and help them
realize that their watershed shares the goals of insolvent debtors—a fresh start and a negotiated reorganization plan that
can endure for many years to come.

